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Abstract 
 
This thesis includes three empirical essays which cover different topics. Before moving to 
the main chapters, I would like to briefly discuss the research question and main findings 
of each project.    
 
Chapter 1 Black-White Wage Convergence in the United States 
This paper explores whether there is a pattern of heterogeneous wage convergence between 
black and white workers in the Southern US relative to the Non-Southern US during the 
post-Civil Rights era. Heterogeneity in relation to the South may be plausibly associated 
with a range of determinants: the region’s historical experience of slavery, different 
observable factors, or changing political and social institutions. My evidence from US 
Census data for 1980, 1990 and 2000 indicates that a strong pattern of “black-black” and 
“black-white” wage convergence exists between Southern born and Non-Southern born 
individuals. This wage convergence pattern, particularly amongst black workers, is similar 
across Southern states associated with different historical intensities of slavery, but it is 
stronger and more persistent for the low wage groups in the South. In addition, the wage 
convergence is mainly from the low wage quartile groups. My assessment of the impact of 
institutional changes as a driver of wage convergence suggests that the changes associated 
with rising political competition from 1960 to 1980 contributed to rising black wages.    
 
Chapter 2 Hate Crime and Victory of Obama 
This paper examines whether Obama’s 2008 electoral victory affected hate crimes. Hate 
crime data from 2005 to 2012 indicate that anti-black and total hate crimes declined 
significantly in Blue States after Obama won the election, relative to Red States. The drop 
is even more significant in States that supported the Democratic presidential candidates in 
the 2004 and 2008 elections. Moreover, this decline is highly associated with the decreasing 
education gap between black people and white people. These findings suggest that Obama’s 
victory played a role in reducing the number of hate crimes in the US.  
 
Chapter 3 The Long-Run Labor Market Consequences of Being Born in A Bad 
Economy 
Recent studies have shown that an economic or environmental shock at an early stage of life 
can have a negative long-term impact on health status as well as educational and labour 
market outcomes. In this study, I examine whether being born during an economic recession 
affects later-life earnings. By utilising 2000 US Census data, I find that males born between 
1965 and 1979 experienced a 1 percent of earning loss with every one unit increase in the 
unemployment rate at year of birth. The effect is similar in those with and without college 
education. Moreover, the effect is stronger in the low wage quartile groups. These findings 
suggest that the labour market consequences of being born in a recession are negative and 
persistent.  
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Chapter 1 Black-White Wage Convergence in the United States 
1. Introduction 
 
Black-white wage and income inequality in the United States is an important aspect of what 
Gunnar Myrdal has termed the “American Dilemma.”1 This situation dramatically changed 
in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the Civil Rights movement, when protests and 
campaigns led to the introduction of policies such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the path of the aggregate “black-
white” income gap from 1950 to 2014. The gap is measured by the ratio of median income 
for black versus white males, such that a higher ratio implies a declining wage gap. It is clear 
from Figure 1 that the racial wage gap declined substantially in the post-Civil Rights era, 
particularly between the periods 1963 to early 1970s, and from 1992 to the early 2000s.2 
However, beneath this declining aggregate wage and income gap, it is worthwhile to note 
regional variations in the general pattern. If we decompose the total “black-white” wage gap 
by region (as shown in Figure 2), it is clear that the wage gap in the Non-South remains 
stable over time while the wage gap in the South declines sharply. This implies that the 
Southern states played a central role in the decline of the black-white wage gap in the US 
overall.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
     
 
                                                          
1 This inequality has historical roots in the system of slavery, which imposed severe constraints on the 
freedom of the black population (e.g. Bertocchi and Dimico (2014)). Although, this system was formally 
abolished after 1865, the black population still lacked significant freedoms and rights, as white-controlled 
governments established discriminatory institutions that restricted opportunities and economic rewards across 
the labour market and the educational and political systems. 
2 Please see the discussion of Chay et al. (2014). 
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    Although studies have identified many factors explaining the decrease in the US black-
white gap, there has been relatively little work that has explicitly addressed how the South’s 
different historical experience of slavery contributed, both in terms of the economic 
conditions that were created by slavery, as well as the complex discriminatory institutions 
that existed up until the Civil Rights era.3 In this paper I explore how the policy changes 
across the labour market and the educational and political systems in the 1950s and 1960s 
may have weakened the power of discriminatory institutions in the South and actively 
contributed to black-white convergence.4  Such a role for institutions could help explain the 
different pattern of convergence in the South and Non-South. 
    The core of my general approach is a study of wage convergence patterns between 
Southern and Non-Southern states. The Southern states are defined as those states that were 
Confederate States during the Civil War.5 My empirical strategy first looks at whether a 
distinctive pattern of regional wage convergence exists for black workers.  I refer to this as 
‘black-black’ wage convergence since it represents a closing of wage gaps between black 
workers on a regional basis. As a point of comparison for this pattern of “black-black” 
regional convergence, I also study the data for evidence of wage convergence between 
Southern born whites and Non-Southern born whites. This comparison with “white-white” 
regional convergence is important because it allows us to rule out a general pattern of 
regional wage convergence that was driven by general macroeconomic factors at the state-
level, for example, secular economic catch-up of the South with the Non-South. 
    To better understand what is driving wage convergence, I also examine wage convergence 
patterns within the South, separating Southern states in three ways.  First, to consider the 
role of a history of slavery, I compare “high” and “middle” slavery states, as measured by 
the state’s slaves-to-population ratio in 1865. Second, I examine convergence patterns across 
wage quartile groups. Finally, to consider the role of changing political institutions, I 
compare “high” and “low” political competition states, as measured by average state 
political competition from 1960 to 1980 (following Besley et al. 2010).   
                                                          
3 Studies have indicated that the decrease in the black-white wage gap, particularly that which occurred in the 
South, was mainly driven by increasing black wages rather any deterioration of conditions in the white labour 
market. The possible reasons include the improvement in earning characteristics, for instance education of 
Southern-born black (e.g. Card and Krueger (1992); Ashenfelter et al. (2006); Chay et al. (2014)) or 
institutional changes in the post-Civil Rights era (e.g. Donohue and Heckman (1991). 
4 The decline of discriminatory institutional power might capture the labour, educational, political and other 
social development of each state in the South in the post-Civil era.  
5 The Confederate states during the Civil War include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. 
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    Practically, my empirical design utilizes a sample of individual “stayer” males (that is, 
men who still reside in their original state of birth) across successive cohorts born between 
1945 and 1959 drawn from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses.6 I implement a 
difference-in-differences (DID) design to study regional wage convergence between the 
South and Non-South as well as the heterogeneity of wage convergence inside the South.7  
    The baseline results show that between-cohort wage convergence for the Southern-born 
black males relative to Non-Southern born black males is evident across data for the 1980, 
1990, and 2000 Censuses. However, I do not find a clear pattern of wage convergence pattern 
between white workers in the South versus in the non-South. Hence this implies that the 
“black-white” racial wage convergence is driven to a significant extent by Southern black 
wages effectively “catching up” with Non-Southern black wages.8 Moreover, in terms of 
wage convergence across the Southern states that experienced high or middle historical 
intensities of slavery, I do find evidence that the wage convergence, mainly from the black 
sample, exists in the states with different historical intensities of slavery. However, there 
exists no heterogeneous wage convergence pattern between the formerly high slavery states 
and the formerly middle slavery states.   
    As for the examination whether the wage convergence pattern may vary across different 
wage quantile group, the results show that the convergence is stronger and more persistent 
in the low wage quartile groups in 1990 and 2000, particularly for the black sample.  
Regarding the effect of political competition level on the wage convergence, the results 
indicate that wage catch-up of Southern-born sample, mainly for the black, exists in the 
formerly middle slavery states that was only associated with a high level of political 
competition as well as in the formerly high slavery states that experienced a high or low 
level of political competition.  
    Since I use the non-migrant “male stayer” sample for the analysis of this paper, there may 
be some concern that issues of labour quality as well as area-level supply may bias the 
                                                          
6 Following Ashenfelter et al. (2006) and Chay et al. (2014), this paper uses the male worker sample of 
Census to examine the current topic. This is because the income of male workers is considered as the main 
source of the family income over this period.  Furthermore, male workers typically display full-time 
attachment to the labour market. Analysis of wage convergence amongst the female workers necessarily 
involves an additional analysis of labour force participation.  
7 The first difference is time (i.e.: the comparison of older to younger cohorts), the second is region (i.e.: 
Southern states versus non-Southern states). In addition, I also use “triple differences” approach, which 
consider race as the third dimension, to examine the “black-white” wage convergence. The estimation results 
of triple differences are in the appendix.  
8 Since the “black-white” wage convergence is mainly found in 1990 and 2000, I will use the sample in 1990 
and 2000 to examine the wage convergence across states with historical root of slavery, wage quartile groups 
and states associated with political situation changes. 
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previous empirical findings. Simply put, the “best” quality workers may have out-migrated 
from key Southern labour markets influencing labour market conditions for the stayers. To 
address this concern about the quality difference between the Southern-born and Non-
Southern born sample, I model the probability of moving conditional on individual 
educational attainments and also measure the educational composition of out-migrating 
cohorts. The findings suggest that the quality of the Southern-born stayer sample may be 
different to the Non-Southern born stayer sample because of this migration issue. To address 
this concern over quality differences, I control for the education levels in all of my regression 
analysis. As for the concern regarding labour supply caused by migration, I first construct a 
migration variable which is measured as the log ratio of the number of black and white 
migrants flowing into each state. I use it as a further control variable in my regression 
analysis. The empirical results are similar to the previous findings; hence, they appear to be 
robust to these concerns.       
    This paper contributes to the “black-white” wage convergence literature by discussing the 
heterogeneous wage convergence pattern amongst blacks and whites in the South. Similar 
to the previous studies, I examine the wage difference between the Southern states and Non-
Southern states. However, I explore the heterogeneous patterns of wage convergence 
between Southern states and Non-Southern states by separating the Southern states into two 
sub-regional groups according to their historical intensity of slavery. In addition, I examine 
the wage convergence pattern across wage groups in the South. Finally, I take advantage of 
the institutional changes in the South from 1960 to 1980 to explore the variation in wage 
convergence patterns across the Southern states.  
    The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and Section3 review related 
literature and discuss the historical background, respectively. Section 4 presents the data. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the main results. Section 7 
discusses the concern of labour quality and labour supply. Lastly, concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper mainly focuses on the evolution of racial wage gaps in the US. It is thus related 
to several studies that have documented the history of racial wage convergence in the US. 
For instance, Donohue and Heckman (1991) discuss the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 on wage convergence between black and white workers. They find that although there 
 12 
 
are core socio-economic factors at play, such as rising education rates and large migration 
flows which have had a role in driving wage convergence between 1960 and 1980, their 
work also supports the hypothesis that the Civil Right Act of 1964 plays an important role. 
Card and Krueger (1992) argue that improvements in school quality also assisted the process 
of black-white wage convergence. They find that improvements in the relative quality of 
black schools can explain around 20% of the change in racial wage gap between 1960 and 
1980. Ashenfelter et al. (2006) discuss the impact of the Brown vs Board of Education 
decision of 1954 on racial wage convergence. They find that Southern-born black wages 
caught up with the Non-Southern-born wages in 1990, as the black demographic benefitted 
from an educational policy which broke racial segregation in public schools. Chay et al. 
(2014) examine the racial wage convergence between Southern-born and Rustbelt-born 
people. Their findings again suggest that racial wage convergence is driven mainly from 
among blacks born in the South. However, not just educational improvement, but also other 
pre-market productivity factors (such as disability rates) can explain the improved economic 
status of the cohorts of blacks born in the South.  
    This paper also extends the current literature by assessing how the institutional changes 
driven by the Civil Right (1964) and Voting Right (1965) Acts could have affected wage 
convergence. In turn, this relates to the literature that emphasizes the importance of initial 
conditions, either economic or environmental, for children’s future development. For 
example, Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) investigate the impact of recessions on 
the earnings of college graduates. They found that graduating in a bad economy could have 
a long-term negative effect on future earnings. Some studies have also discussed the 
influence of environmental shocks on long-term outcomes. For instance, Almond (2006) 
finds that the cohorts who were in utero during the peak of 1918 influenza pandemic 
exhibited lower educational attainment, lower income, and lower socioeconomic status in 
later life. Lin and Liu (2014) also find that those in utero in 1918 influenza were more likely 
to have serious health problem. Cheng (2017a) finds that people born in recessionary periods 
could earn less compared with people born in non-recessionary periods. The children born 
in recessions could not have enough nutrition to develop their ability for the future since the 
wealth of their parents might decline a lot in recessions.   
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3. Historical Background 
3.1 Black in the South 
 
Slavery was a formal legal institution in the US until the end of the Civil War in 1865. It 
was also a key structural basis for the economy in the South. Slaves, mainly from Africa, 
were effectively a source of wealth for plantation owners in the Southern US. In contrast to 
the plantation-based economy of the Southern US, the Northern US economy mainly relied 
on conventional industry. The North did not need the black population as a source of slave 
labour to sustain or improve its economy. This contrast in structural economic conditions 
between the South and North helped trigger the Civil War in 1861 over the abolition of 
slavery (e.g. Foner (1974)). However, during the Civil War, several Southern US states such 
as Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri and West Virginia, still stayed in the Union, 
while others claimed secession from the Union.9 
    In the aftermath of the Civil War in 1865, the black population finally obtained legal 
freedom in the Southern US.  However, they continued to face struggles relating to 
institutional discrimination in the years after the Civil War. Du Bios (1935) documents that 
significant political forces in the South still sought to re-establish  de facto slavery conditions 
after the Civil War. Legal structures such as the Black Codes and Jim Crow laws were 
introduced to limit the economic and social freedoms of the black population. Specifically, 
the Black Codes restricted black labour market activity and ensured their availability as a 
lower-cost labour force. The implementation of Jim Crow laws enforced a strict segregation 
between blacks and white with Southern government’s holding that that blacks still a 
“separate but equal” status in society. The Jim Crow laws separated blacks from the white 
population in schools, hospitals, hotels and other areas of the labour market. These 
segregation laws also authorized legal punishment for consorting with the opposite race. 
Furthermore, the laws also denied blacks the right to vote. In addition to these laws, some 
anti-black organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan engaged in organised violence against 
the black population. Hence it is clear that blacks in the South did not enjoy the same 
economic and political status as whites despite gaining legal freedom after the Civil War.10 
                                                          
9 The states that remained in the Union and those that left the Union can be expected to have different racial 
attitudes to the black population. The states that claimed secession from the Union are referred to as the 
Confederacy.  
10 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) indicate that this is the result from that the Southern US after Civil War 
exhibited changes of the political institution but the economic institution still unchanged. For more details 
regarding the institution changes, please see the discussion in their paper.  
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    Conditions changed gradually as significant historical events occurred such as World War 
I, the Great Depression and World War II. These events weakened the resolve of the white 
in the South to block the black.11 At the same time, economic growth in the Southern US fell 
far behind that of the Northern US since the economy in the South continued to depend on 
agriculture while the economy in the North was assisted by a strong industrial base. In line 
with this economic imbalance across regions, a long wave of black migration from South to 
North took place between 1910 and 1970. During this period, known as the ‘Great 
Migration’, there was an estimated total of around 6 million black migrants moving out of 
the South into the North and other parts of the US.  
    Although blacks in the South could have access to higher earnings if they chose to move 
to other places, their social status would still lower than that of white people, due to the 
segregation laws. Civil rights movements or freedom struggles, which emerged during the 
1950s and 1960s, had goals were to end the racial segregation and discrimination against 
black people and to secure their civil rights. The most significant achievements of the Civil 
Rights movement are Brown v. Board of Education of 1954, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Right Act of 1965. The Brown decision in 1954 ensured that black people 
could access more educational resources than before. Black children were given the 
opportunity to study with white children, in the same schools. The Civil Rights Act, passed 
in 1964, tended to eliminate discrimination against black people in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ensured black people would have the right to 
vote and enjoy equal political status in the US. Under these laws, it thus became more 
difficult for the white population in the south states to exert their traditional level of control 
over the black community. Furthermore, the legal changes significantly affected the 
opportunities available to black people. It was an unprecedented advance in the legal and 
social status of black people in America.  
    The policies in 1950s and 1960s removed major barriers faced by Southern blacks in the 
labour market, schools, hospitals and the general political system. These reforms therefore 
led to a sharp improvement in the economic or social status of blacks in the South. However, 
the effects of the reforms are likely to have been heterogeneous within the South given that 
the nature of the discriminatory institutions in place at the time of the Civil Rights reforms 
varied by state. Furthermore, it is plausible that the strength of these discriminatory 
institutions was closely related to initial conditions defined in terms of the historical intensity 
                                                          
11 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also argue that the collapse of southern white power was especially 
hastened after World War II. 
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of slavery across areas. Hence, this potential heterogeneity in state-level institutions is a key 
focus of my empirical analysis.  
 
3.2 Political Institutional Condition in the South 
 
The previous section discussed the role of the Black Codes and Jim Crow laws in 
perpetuating White control of economic and political power in the South. The Civil Rights 
movement in the 1950s and 1960s weakened the power of white-biased social institutions 
bu enhancing black rights in a number of domains. For example, the Brown v Board decision 
greatly increased educational opportunities for black students. The Civil Rights (1964) and 
Voting Rights (1965) Acts also intervened in stopping the unfair treatment that the black 
population received in the labour market and political system. These policies affected the 
general situation such as labour market, politics, education and other social changes in the 
South. In this section, I would like to discuss a particular changes of political system in the 
South from 1960 to 1980 and discuss its impact on the wage behaviour of the people in the 
South.     
    The changes of political situation from 1960 to 1980, which could be measured by state 
average political competition (Besely et al. 2010), was mainly driven by the Civil Right 
(1964) and Voting Right (1965) Acts. Figure 3 describes the political competition across the 
South and Non-South.12 From this figure, the level of political competition in the South had 
a dramatically increase after 1960.13 In fact, Besley et al. (2010) emphasize that the 
increasing political competition could make the region’s politician propose more pro-growth 
policies and then improve the economic development. Figure 4 indicates the positive 
relationship between average personal income and political competition in the South from 
1960 to 1980. Thus, the political situation change can be seen as a proxy for an initial 
economic situation when the people entered the labour market. This change could make the 
South exhibit different wage convergence relative to the Non-South. 
                                                          
12 The political competition measure is from Besley et al. (2010). They define a political competition of each 
state in each year as follows: 𝑘𝑠𝑡 = −|𝑑𝑠𝑡 − 0.5|, where 𝑘𝑠𝑡 is the party-neutral measure and 𝑑𝑠𝑡 is the 
average vote share of the Democrats in all state-wide races in state s at time t. The max of 𝑘𝑠𝑡 is 0 that 
indicates the voting share of the Democrats is equal to the one of the Republicans in state s at time t. Because 
of minus sign, higher values of 𝑘𝑠𝑡 correspond to states and year with more political competition.  
13 In fact, before 1960s, white Southerners were more likely to identify as Democrats than others. However, 
after 1960s, massive white Southerners departed from supporting the Democratic Party to supporting the 
Republican Party. Please see more discussion in Kuziemko and Washington (2016).   
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[Figure 3 here] 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
4. Data   
4.1 Data and Sample 
 
The main datasets used in this paper are the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Census files. I focus 
mainly on the black and white male ‘stayer’ samples born between 1945 and 1959 across 
the different Census waves. A stayer is defined as an individual who resides in his place of 
birth.14 By tracking the same cohort across Census waves I am therefore able to track wage 
changes across the employment life cycle. Note here that ‘the South’ in my working 
definition refers to the Confederate states, which formed the core areas of the legal slavery 
system up to the Civil War.  
    In order to test for heterogeneous wage catch-up patterns within the South, I define two 
subgroups of states based on ‘high’ and ‘mid-level’ intensities of slavery prior to the Civil 
War. The high-slavery states are those that had a pre-Civil War slavery ratio of above 43 %, 
the median of the slavery ratio in the Confederate states. The states comprising this group 
are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina.15 The formerly 
middle-slavery states are defined as those with a slavery ratio below 43 %, and include 
Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Furthermore, in later exercises I 
split the sample into wage quartiles to see if the regional wage convergence pattern differs 
across different wage groups.  
    In terms of institutional differences across states, I classify the Southern sample into two 
groups: one with low average rates of political competition group and the other with high 
rates. The low (high) political competition group comprises states with average political 
competition indexes that are below (above) -0.15, which is the median of state average 
                                                          
14 The sample used in this analysis is the cohort born after World War II when the collapse of white power 
occurred. They entered the labour market in 1980 when their ages were between 21 and 35. The reason why I 
use stayer sample is that a stayer could experience more about the institutional changes that were driven by 
the policies in 1950s and 1960s, particularly for the sample in the South.  
15 The six states are located in the Deep South, which is a cultural and geographic sub-region in the Southern 
United States. 
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political competition in the South from 1960 to 1980. Moreover, I also apply these criteria 
to the former middle and high slavery states see whether political competition across 
Southern states could drive different wage catch-up patterns within the states with slavery 
ratios.16   
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Wage 
 
As a first look at the different wage patterns of Southern born and Non-Southern born 
workers, similar to Ashenfelter et al. (2006), I group the male workers into five year-of-birth 
cohorts: 1945-47, 1948-50, 1951-53, 1954-56, and 1957-59. Moreover, I assign men a 
“southern-born” dummy equal to one if they were born in the former Confederate states.  
The results in Table 1 show that black wages are always lower than white wages across all 
cohorts and regions. In addition, both black and white wages in the South are lower than 
their counterparts in the Non-South. Importantly, the wage gap between the South and Non-
South decreases across the cohorts, particularly for the black sample. This finding implies 
that relative to the older cohorts of black workers in the South, the younger cohorts may 
have benefited from a process of wage catch-up relative to contemporaneous black cohorts 
in the Non-South.17  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
    I also plot the regional log wage gap by racial group from 1980 to 2000 in Figures 5-7. 
From Figure 5, one can observe that both the black and white wage gaps decrease across 
cohorts in the data taken from the 1980 Census. This result could be due to the recent labour 
market entry of the younger cohorts. However, based on the evidence in Figures 6 and 7 we 
                                                          
16 The previous classification regarding historical root of slavery may capture many possible changes in 
labour market, educational, political systems and other institutions. The new classification according to the 
level of political competition particularly captures the effect of changes in political systems. Thus, the new 
groups are different to the groups under the classification according to the historical slavery ratio.   
17 I also show the average racial real wage of those born in formerly high-slavery states, formerly middle-
slavery states and Non-Southern states in Table A1. From results of the Table A1, one can observe people 
born in the formerly high slavery states earn less than those born in the formerly middle slavery states and 
those born in the Non-South, especially for the black. This finding shows that there exists regional difference 
among the black born in the South. One can also observe that the wage gap between the black born in the 
South, either in the formerly high or middle slavery states, and the black born in the Non-South decreases 
across cohorts. However, I do not find there is clear wage convergence pattern for the white sample.  
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can see that the black wage gap shows a strong decreasing trend across successive cohorts. 
In contrast, there is no sign of a decreasing regional wage gap for white workers the 1990 
and 2000 Census data. Taken together these findings provide evidence of differential wage 
convergence patterns across regions according to race. Specifically, it is clear that black 
wages in the South grew strongly relative to non-Southern black wages and I focus heavily 
on this finding in our remaining analysis. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
5.1 Baseline Regression Model  
 
In my first empirical exercise I develop a regression framework to estimate the between-
cohort wage convergence for those born in the South relative to those born in the Non-South 
by racial groups (black and white). Similar to Ashenfelter et al. (2006) and Chay et al. 
(2014), I use a simple difference-in-differences regression model (DID) to explore this idea. 
The advantage of the DID model is that the level of wage of different race-cohorts from 
different areas would be differenced out in the estimation. That is, even though the initial 
level of wage of one group was higher than the other group, it will not affect the estimation 
result. The DID model would measure the area-race wage difference between cohorts. 
Hence, the DID model can be applied to examine in this study area-race wage convergence. 
The regression model is as follows.    
 
Log(𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛾𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑡(𝑠 ×
4
𝑡=1
𝑐𝑡) + 𝑥′𝑖𝑏𝑦𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑦                            (1) 
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where i, b and y index individuals, place of birth and year of birth, respectively. Further 
indices that are important are s (indicating if a person was born in the South) and c for cohort 
(allowing us to track those born in the same years across successive census waves). The 
main variable of interest is wage w and x is a set of observable covariates such as occupation, 
industry and education. 
    The cohort variable is constructed as a 3-year band cohort group such that there are 5 
cohort groups in our study. The reference group is those who born between 1945 and 1947. 
𝛽1,𝑡, 𝑡 = 1, … ,4  are the main parameters of interest and we can expect that 𝛽1,𝑡 > 0 if the 
wages of the younger cohorts in the South could catch up with their race-cohort counterparts 
in the Non-South.  
It is worthy to mention that the DID setting in the current paper is not a typical setting as 
shown in the literature since it may not fully identify the causal effects of the policies on the 
wage outcome. In this paper, we do not have a well-defined treatment group as there might 
exist samples that migrated to other places such that we may not measure precise effects of 
the policies. To address this issue, we adopt the stayer sample whose place of residence is 
the same as place of birth to control the possible bias due to migration. Moreover, since 
migration inflows could also affect the supply in the labour market of destination, I construct 
a labour supply variable which measures the inflow of migration and add this variable in the 
estimation. The empirical results including the migration variable are presented in the 
section 7.   
5.2 Regression Model for Assessing Slavery Related Institutions 
 
Following the baseline model in section 5.1, I extend the model by defining the Southern-
born group in terms of two subgroups relating to high and mid intensity experiences of 
slavery. The regression model below studies how the historical slavery ratio may have 
affected wage convergence. 
 
Log(𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛾𝑦 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽1,𝑆𝑡(𝑆𝑆 ×
4
𝑡=1
𝑐𝑡)
2
𝑆=1
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝑏𝑦𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑦       (2) 
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where 𝑆𝑆, 𝑆 = 1, 2 indicates the Southern states associated with high or middle intensities of 
slavery. Other variables are the same as in the baseline model and 𝛽1,𝑆𝑡, 𝑆 = 1,2, 𝑡 =
1, … ,4 are the parameters of main interest.18 If wage convergence exists, these parameters 
are expected to be positive as stated in Section 5.1. In addition, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients might be different between the formerly high and middle slavery intensity states 
if a heterogeneous wage convergence pattern exists.  
Finally, I also modify these basic models with additional interactions by wage quartile. This 
allows me to test whether the pattern of wage convergence differs at high or low wage 
quartile groups.  
 
5.3 Regression Model for Assessing Political Related Institutions 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the role of the Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) 
Acts increased the political competition in South from 1960 to 1980. Moreover, Besley et 
al. (2010) further point out that more pro-growth policies associated with the increasing 
political competition in the South could improve economic development. Therefore, 
economic development caused by the increasing political competition could have had an 
influence on black wage convergence. To examine this idea, I adapt the regression model 
below to study how the changing political conditions may have affected wage convergence. 
 
Log(𝑤𝑖𝑏𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛾𝑦 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽1,𝐼𝑡(𝑆𝐼 ×
4
𝑡=1
𝑐𝑡)
2
𝐼=1
+ 𝑥′𝑖𝑏𝑦𝜃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑏𝑦       (3) 
where 𝑆𝐼 , 𝐼 = 1, 2 indicates the Southern states associated with low or high political 
competition. Other variables follow the same definitions as model (1), with 𝛽1,𝐼𝑡, 𝐼 =
                                                          
18 The current model uses the dummy variables that represent formerly high or middle slavery states to 
examine the regional wage convergence. This approach can give us a clear distinction of wage convergence 
pattern between the formerly high and middle slavery states. Instead of this approach, one can also use the 
actual historical slavery intensities of each Southern state in the model to examine the idea. However, the 
results from continuous slavery ratio may implicitly show us the difference of wage convergence within the 
Southern states. As this paper would like to see if there exists an explicit heterogeneous wage convergence 
pattern within the Southern states that experienced high or middle slavery intensities, the dummy variable 
approach is thus preferred. 
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1, 2, 𝑡 = 1, … ,4  as the parameters of main interest.19 We expect that these parameters should 
be positive if wage convergence exists and varies systematically with state-level political 
competition. Furthermore, I also examine that whether wage catch-up could vary in the 
formerly high and middle slavery states that experienced low or high level of political 
competition.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Baseline Results 
 
Table 2 displays the baseline estimates of model (1) without fixed effects. The first three 
columns and the last three columns show the results of the black sample and the white 
samples, respectively.  The results are in line with Figures 5-7, showing between-cohort 
wage convergence between Southern-born and Non-Southern born blacks. In the first 
column, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms  indicate that 
the between-cohort wage convergence for black workers in 1980 is about 6 % to 13 % and 
only exists for those born between 1954 and 1959. The results from the second and the third 
columns show the magnitude of the estimates in 1990 and 2000 is about 6-10 % for the 
young cohorts born between 1948 and 1959. As for the estimation results of the white 
sample, there is not a very clear pattern of wage convergence. Although the findings in 1980 
show that some wage convergence also exists in the white sample, the results of 1980 may 
not be so reliable since the young cohorts being considered have just entered the labour 
market at this time and, thus, there might exist some noise in their wage outcomes. Table 3 
shows the estimates with fixed effects included. The results confirm that the wage 
convergence is mainly from the black sample rather than white sample in the South.20 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
[Table 3 here] 
                                                          
19 We can also use a continuous political competition level variable in the DID analysis. However, this paper 
would prefer the dummy approach since this approach can give us a clearer picture regarding the 
heterogeneous wage convergence with the Southern states that associated with high or low political 
competition level.  
20 Note that the estimation results from this point forward are based on the fixed effects models.     
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6.2 Baseline Results by States Associated With Historical Slavery Ratio 
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the empirical model (2) that considers different areas 
of the South according to their initial slavery intensities. The first three columns show the 
results for black workers by sub-region of the South relative to black workers in the Non-
South. One can see a clear wage convergence pattern for blacks born in the formerly high 
slavery states, especially for the younger cohorts that were born between 1951 and 1959. 
The magnitude of the wage convergence is between 7 % and 16 %. As for black workers 
born in the formerly middle slavery states, the wage convergence for them relative to the 
Southern-born black also exists and is estimated as being slightly lower - between 7 % and 
11%. However, if one compares the coefficients of interaction terms between the formerly 
high and middle slavery states across years, there exists no significant difference between 
the coefficients. Thus, the wage convergence patterns may be similar in the states with 
different historical experiences of slavery. By comparison the results for the white worker 
sample, similar to what has been observed from Table 2 and Table3, show no evidence of a 
clear wage convergence pattern across different years. Although we observe that there exists 
wage convergence in white sample in 1980 and 1990, the convergence from 1980 white 
sample could be that they just entered in the labour market and thus there might exist some 
noise in the data. As for the convergence from the 1990 white worker sample in formerly 
middle slavery states, this could be driven by the low income group.21 In addition, one can 
also notice that the magnitude of the convergence is much smaller than the magnitude of the 
black wage convergence. 22 23     
 
 
                                                          
21 We can confirm this from the results of Table 7.  
22 I also consider the black and white sample together to examine “black-white” wage convergence between 
regions. Table A2 displays the results of triple difference approach that consider both of the black and white 
samples. One can observe the between-cohort racial wage convergence for those born in the South relative to 
those born in the Non-South in 1990 and 2000. The magnitude of the estimates is between 7 % and 11 %. 
Moreover, Table A3 shows results that take the different subgroups of the South into account. I find evidence 
of black-white wage convergence for those born in the South relative to those born in the Non-South. The 
magnitude of the estimates is between 8 % and 13 %. Again, one cannot directly conclude that the “black-
white” wage convergence is stronger in the formerly high slavery states since the test shows that the 
coefficients of formerly high slavery states are not statistically different to the coefficients of formerly middle 
slavery states.   
23 Instead of the dummy approach, I also use a continuous historical slavery ratio variable in the analysis. The 
estimation results can be found in Table A4. The results from Table A4 indicate that the wage convergence is 
mainly from the black sample. The higher the slavery intensity is, the stronger the wage convergence is.   
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[Table 4 here] 
 
6.3 Results by Wage Quartile Group 
 
Since the regional “black-white” wage convergence is mainly evident for the 1990 and 2000 
Census samples, I now focus on these Census years in my subsequent analysis of wage 
convergence patterns.   
    Table 5 and 6 show the estimation results from different wage quartiles for the 1990 and 
2000 Census years, respectively. For the black sample in 1990 and 2000, the results indicate 
that wage convergence in the South relative to the Non-South is mainly evident for the first 
three quartile groups but not in the last quartile group. Again, in contrast I do not find a clear 
persistent wage convergence pattern across 1990 and 2000 for the sample of white workers. 
Although there exists some wage convergence for the white sample in the low wage quartile 
groups in 1990, the magnitude of wage convergence is quite small relative to the estimates 
from the black sample. This finding indicates that the black sample still plays an important 
role in the wage convergence observation. If we compare the magnitude of the coefficients 
between the black and white samples, we can see that the magnitudes are larger in the black 
sample. Thus, the findings above suggest that there exists a pattern of heterogeneous wage 
convergence black workers across different wage quartile groups.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
    In regard to the analysis of sub-regional groups within the South, Table 7 and 8 report the 
model (2) results for the samples of 1990 and 2000 Census years. The findings are similar 
to those found earlier in Tables 5 and 6. The magnitude of the convergence pattern is again 
larger in the black sample relative to the white sample. In addition, the convergence is mainly 
driven by the bottom wage quartile groups. Moreover, there exists no difference in the 
magnitude of convergence between workers in the formerly high and middle states.  
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[Table 7 here] 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
6.4 The Role of Institutions in Black Wage Convergence 
 
The previous sections have indicated that there were significant cross-regional shifts in black 
wages from the 1980s onwards. In this section I discuss how the changes in political systems 
and institutions from 1960 to 1980 may have driven this pattern of black wage convergence. 
    Table 9 shows the estimation results of empirical model (3) that considers the Southern 
states associated with different level of political competition. Consistent to the previous 
findings, we can observe that wage convergence is mainly concentrated in the black sample. 
Furthermore, if we compare the magnitude of convergence for the black sample between the 
Southern states associated with low and high level of political competition, we can find the 
difference between them is not statistically significant.24  
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
    Table 10 presents the estimation results that considers the sub-regional group within the 
South associated with different level of political competition. Again, the wage convergence 
is mainly found in the black sample. Furthermore, if we check the magnitude of convergence 
for black workers across the Southern states, we find that the convergence is stronger in the 
formerly high slavery states regardless of any level of political competition as well as in the 
formerly middle slavery states associated with high political competition. These findings 
                                                          
24 I also use a continuous political competition variable instead of dummy political variable in the analysis, 
the results are shown in the Table A5.The results show that the speed of wage catch-up of the sample, 
particularly the black from the lower political competition Southern states, is faster than those from the 
higher political competition Southern states. Note that although the estimated coefficients from 2000 Census 
sample are insignificant, the magnitudes of the coefficients from the black sample are still larger than the 
white sample.  
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suggest that a heterogeneous wage convergence pattern for the black sample exists when we 
consider the slavery intensive states associated with different level of political competition.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
       
7 Labour Quality and Labour Supply Concern 
 
Since sample of labour market ‘stayers’ in my previous analysis, there may exist concerns 
that are related to a potential quality difference between the non-migrating stayers in the 
South versus the Non-South and labour supply induced by inflows of labour migration. To 
see if there exists a quality difference between these two groups, I firstly examine conditional 
probability of moving according to education levels since this would be a major driver of 
labour quality differences.25 According to the linear probability model (LPM) estimates in 
Table 11, it is evident that more education people had a higher probability of moving. 
Moreover, the magnitude of estimated coefficient from well-educated black sample in the 
South seems to be larger than their counterparts in the Non-South as well as the white 
sample. Therefore, to address this possible concern, I have added an educational variable to 
control the quality of sample to alleviate the bias concern. The empirical results that have 
been shown in the previous section still confirm wage convergence of the black sample. 
 
[Table 11 here] 
 
    Furthermore, there is a potential concern about the effect of migration flows on labour 
supply. Migration outflows from the original states might have reduced labour supply of 
original states and pushed the wage up. Similarly, migration inflows to the other states would 
have increased labour supply of other states and pushed the wage down.  In net terms, this 
would bias the measurement of regional wage convergence between South and Non-South. 
To address the migration outflow concern, I calculate the proportion of movers who had 
different level of education and resided in the Southern and the Non-Southern states as 
                                                          
25 Here, the sample with higher education attainments is defined as those who had educational attainments of 
high school and above and the low-educated sample is defined as those who had educational attainments 
below 12th grade. 
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shown in Table 12.  From the Table, one can observe that the migration is mainly from the 
sample with better education. Furthermore, we can observe that the moving proportion of 
both well-educated Non-Southern born black and white is larger than the moving proportion 
of their Southern-born counterparts. The migration outflows would make the wage increase 
more in the Non-south than the South. Thus, the migration outflows could weaken the results 
of wage convergence. Since the wage convergence of the black sample still exists, the 
adverse effect on the wage convergence could be mild in the analysis.   
[Table 12 here] 
 
    To address the migration inflow concern, I calculate the cell size of black and white 
migration inflows at state of residence, education, industry and cohort levels.26 Then, I 
construct a labour supply variable that measures the ratio of the number of black and white 
migration. I thus re-run the exercises of Tables 3 and Table 4 by controlling the log of this 
labour supply measure in the regression analysis. The results are presented in the Table 13 
and 14. The estimation results show that the effect of state migration labour supply is 
insignificant. Although the effect is insignificant, one still can see that the migration labour 
supply in the local market could be positively or negatively related to the wage outcome as 
shown in the tables. After controlling for the effect of the potential labour supply confounder, 
we can observe that the wage convergence magnitude is still similar to the magnitude of the 
baseline estimation as shown in Table 3 and 4. Thus the findings here suggest that the results 
found before may not be driven by migration labour supply.  
 
[Table 13 here] 
 
[Table 14 here] 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 This follows Boustan (2009), who explores the impact of migration between 1940 and 1970 from the 
South on the wage outcome of the North. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
This paper discusses the wage convergence between the black and the white by using the 
male stayer sample born between 1945 and 1959 from the 1980, 1990 and 200 Census data 
sets. I find evidence of between-cohort “black-black” and “black-white” wage convergence 
for those in the South relative to those in the Non-South, particularly in the 1990 and 2000 
Census cross-sections. Moreover, I find there exists no difference in wage convergence 
patterns based on their historical experiences of slavery. However, there do exist 
heterogeneous convergence patterns across the wage quartile groups, and this is particularly 
strong for blacks in the lowest quartile of the wage distribution. In addition, the magnitude 
of wage convergence across the wage groups is larger in the black sample compared to the 
white sample. The findings suggest that the policies that were enacted in the 1950s and 1960s 
across the labour market and political / educational systems strongly benefited black workers 
in the South.  
    Since the political changes that occurred in the South from 1960 to 1980 were triggered 
by the Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) Acts, I use the state-level political 
competition as a proxy measure to capture the extent of the institutional changes. The results 
indicate that relative to the sample in the Non-South: (1) there exists a stronger wage 
convergence pattern in the formerly middle slavery states with high levels of political 
competition; and (2) there also exists a stronger convergence pattern in the formerly high 
slavery states with high or low levels of political competition. As a consequence, this 
indicates that institutional changes may have had distinct effects on regional wage 
convergence amongst blacks over and above the general rise in black wages observed across 
the US in this period. 
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Figure 1 Black-White Male Ratio of Median Income 
 
 
Figure 2 Black-White Male Ratio of Median Income by Region 
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Figure 3 Political Competition by Region 
 
 
Figure 4 Income and Political Competition 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Wage by Regions and Cohorts 
 
Panel A Black 
Year  1980   1990   2000   
Cohort South 
Non-
South Diff South 
Non-
South Diff South 
Non-
South Diff 
45-47 15.7 18.9 -3.2 16.5 22.1 -5.6 18.6 23.9 -5.3 
48-50 14.5 17.1 -2.6 16.2 20.9 -4.7 18.8 23.4 -4.6 
51-53 13.0 15.1 -2.1 15.3 19.1 -3.8 18.3 22.2 -3.9 
54-56 11.0 12.3 -1.3 14.0 17.6 -3.6 17.5 20.7 -3.2 
57-59 7.9 8.4 -0.5 12.8 15.6 -2.8 16.4 19.6 -3.2 
Long Diff in Diff (57-59 versus 45-47) 
 2.7*** 2.6*** 2.1*** 
 (0.2) (0.3) (0.5) 
Panel B White 
Year  1980   1990   2000  
Cohort South 
Non-
South Diff South 
Non-
South Diff South 
Non-
South Diff 
45-47 22.7 25.2 -2.5 26.1 29.9 -3.8 28.7 31.2 -2.5 
48-50 20.6 22.5 -1.9 25.2 28.5 -3.3 29.1 31.2 -2.1 
51-53 18.3 19.6 -1.3 23.7 26.5 -2.8 28.2 30.4 -2.2 
54-56 15.0 15.9 -0.9 22.0 24.7 -2.7 27.5 29.7 -2.2 
57-59 10.8 10.9 -0.1 19.8 22.6 -2.8 26.1 29.0 -2.9 
Long Diff in Diff (57-59 versus 45-47) 
 2.4*** 1.0*** -0.4 
 (0.9) (0.2) (0.3) 
Notes:  This table reports mean wages by pooled 3-year band cohorts for Black and White 
men over 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census waves. Units are given in thousands of dollars and 
wages have been deflated by the US consumer price index (1982-1984==100).  The states in 
the South are defined as: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. The states in the Non-South 
are all other states. Number in the parentheses is standard error. *** indicates 1 % 
significance level.  
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Figure 5 Log Wage Gap by Race in 1980 
 
Figure 6 Log Wage Gap by Race in 1990 
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Figure 7 Log Wage Gap by Race in 2000 
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Table 2 DID Estimation without Fixed Effects 
  
 
Black     
 
White   
Year 1980 1990 2000   1980 1990 2000 
South -0.116*** -0.140*** -0.157*** 
 
-0.094*** -0.104*** -0.054** 
 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.035) 
 
(0.033) (0.028) (0.024) 
Cohort4850 -0.124*** -0.101*** -0.019 
 
-0.116*** -0.058*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.037) 
 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) 
Cohort5153 -0.256*** -0.214*** -0.099*** 
 
-0.274*** -0.115*** -0.005 
 
(0.020) (0.031) (0.025) 
 
(0.014) (0.005) (0.007) 
Cohort5456 -0.497*** -0.307*** -0.177*** 
 
-0.512*** -0.177*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.010) (0.031) (0.024) 
 
(0.022) (0.005) (0.006) 
Cohort5759 -0.952*** -0.425*** -0.216*** 
 
-0.951*** -0.249*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.016) (0.041) (0.030) 
 
(0.034) (0.007) (0.005) 
SouthXCohort4
850 0.009 0.074** 0.026 
 
0.016 0.009 -0.002 
 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.043) 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
SouthXCohort5
153 0.014 0.093** 0.060* 
 
0.048*** 0.010 -0.007 
 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.033) 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) 
SouthXCohort5
456 0.063*** 0.087** 0.101*** 
 
0.058** 0.018** -0.000 
 
(0.015) (0.035) (0.031) 
 
(0.023) (0.009) (0.009) 
SouthXCohort5
759 0.130*** 0.100** 0.089** 
 
0.103*** 0.010 -0.018* 
 
(0.025) (0.043) (0.039) 
 
(0.036) (0.010) (0.010) 
R-squared 0.139 0.100 0.079   0.186 0.116 0.098 
Place of Birth NO NO NO 
 
NO NO NO 
Year of Birth NO NO NO 
 
NO NO NO 
Controls YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Observation 77,060 57,646 55,181   676,474 595,391 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table 3 DID Estimation with Fixed Effects 
  
Black 
   
White 
 
Year 1980 1990 2000 
 
1980 1990 2000 
SouthXCohort
4850 0.015 0.075** 0.026 
 
0.015 0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.044) 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
SouthXCohort
5153 0.023 0.098** 0.062* 
 
0.045*** 0.007 -0.011 
 
(0.025) (0.037) (0.033) 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) 
SouthXCohort
5456 0.072*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 
 
0.056** 0.017* -0.003 
 
(0.016) (0.035) (0.031) 
 
(0.023) (0.009) (0.009) 
SouthXCohort
5759 0.137*** 0.114** 0.092** 
 
0.101*** 0.009 -0.020* 
 
(0.026) (0.043) (0.040) 
 
(0.036) (0.011) (0.010) 
R-squared 0.150 0.108 0.084 
 
0.198 0.131 0.110 
Place of Birth YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Observation 77,060 57,646 55,181   676,474 595,391 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table 4 DID Estimation by Regional Subgroup 
  
Black 
   
White 
 
Year 1980 1990 2000 
 
1980 1990 2000 
HighXCohort
4850 0.017 0.058 0.068 
 
0.020* -0.009 -0.006 
 
(0.025) (0.040) (0.041) 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
HighXCohort
5153 0.009 0.106** 0.093** 
 
0.038** -0.008 0.002 
 
(0.027) (0.041) (0.037) 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.016) 
HighXCohort
5456 0.073*** 0.095** 0.134*** 
 
0.054** -0.001 0.014 
 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.028) 
 
(0.027) (0.012) (0.011) 
HighXCohort
5759 0.161*** 0.125** 0.104** 
 
0.107*** 0.001 -0.019 
 
(0.033) (0.047) (0.040) 
 
(0.040) (0.008) (0.015) 
MidXCohort
4850 0.013 0.098** -0.024   0.011 0.016** -0.005 
 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.051) 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) 
MidXCohort
5153 0.040 0.086** 0.025 
 
0.050*** 0.017* -0.019* 
 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.041) 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.011) 
MidXCohort
5456 0.070*** 0.098** 0.068 
 
0.057** 0.029*** -0.014 
 
(0.023) (0.047) (0.042) 
 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.009) 
MidXCohort
5759 0.107*** 0.100** 0.079 
 
0.098*** 0.015 -0.020 
  (0.025) (0.044) (0.053)   (0.036) (0.015) (0.012) 
R-squared 0.150 0.108 0.084   0.198 0.131 0.110 
Place of Birth YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES 
Observation 77,060 57,646 55,181   676,474 595,391 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table 5  1990 DID Estimation by Wage Quartile Group        
  
 
Black       
 
White     
Quartile Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
SouthXCohort4850 0.173** 0.096*** 0.039*** 0.000 
 
0.021 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.083) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) 
 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
SouthXCohort5153 0.159** 0.131*** 0.057*** 0.028 
 
0.009 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.017** 
 
(0.072) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
SouthXCohort5456 0.226*** 0.135*** 0.061*** 0.029 
 
0.078*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.007 
 
(0.066) (0.012) (0.009) (0.021) 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
SouthXCohort5759 0.206** 0.168*** 0.076*** 0.014 
 
0.035** 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.006 
 
(0.080) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) 
 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
R-squared 0.187 0.774 0.830 0.474   0.191 0.821 0.822 0.414 
Place of Birth YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Observation 15,033 14,661 14,151 13,801   153,222 148,793 149,368 144,008 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 
10% significance level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 6 2000 DID Estimation by Wage Quartile Group         
  
 
 Black       
 
 White     
Quartile Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
South X Cohort4850 0.104 0.070*** 0.029** -0.016 
 
-0.044** -0.004 0.003* 0.006 
 
(0.090) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) 
 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) 
South X Cohort5153 0.203** 0.084*** 0.036*** -0.010 
 
-0.018 0.013*** 0.003 -0.009 
 
(0.078) (0.013) (0.011) (0.027) 
 
(0.019) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) 
South X Cohort5456 0.260*** 0.139*** 0.047*** -0.012 
 
-0.029 0.016*** 0.005* -0.022*** 
 
(0.071) (0.010) (0.009) (0.028) 
 
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
South X Cohort5759 0.302*** 0.124*** 0.047*** -0.024 
 
-0.048*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.085) (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) 
 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) 
R-squared 0.143 0.733 0.774 0.276   0.131 0.752 0.776 0.391 
Place of Birth YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Observation 14,236 14,028 13,684 13,233   137,620 134,929 134,928 130,255 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 
10% significance level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 7 1990 DID Estimation by Quartile and Regional Subgroup  
   Black          White     
Quartile Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
High X Cohort4850 0.131 0.096*** 0.032*** -0.013  0.011 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.021 
 (0.093) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) 
High X Cohort5153 0.168** 0.135*** 0.056*** 0.016  -0.009 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.013 
 (0.073) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021)  (0.020) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) 
High X Cohort5456 0.213*** 0.132*** 0.059*** 0.023  0.051* 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.005 
 (0.070) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021)  (0.026) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014) 
High X Cohort5759 0.212** 0.163*** 0.076*** 0.017  0.047* 0.027*** 0.017*** -0.017 
  (0.098) (0.015) (0.012) (0.020)   (0.024) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
Mid X Cohort4850 0.234*** 0.095*** 0.047*** 0.015  0.027** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.026** 
 (0.083) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025)  (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
Mid X Cohort5153 0.147* 0.126*** 0.060*** 0.041**  0.019 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020** 
 (0.086) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Mid X Cohort5456 0.245*** 0.138*** 0.063*** 0.036  0.095*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.009 
 (0.078) (0.012) (0.008) (0.031)  (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) 
Mid X Cohort5759 0.198** 0.174*** 0.076*** 0.010  0.027 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.001 
  (0.077) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)   (0.022) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
R-squared 0.187 0.774 0.830 0.474  0.191 0.821 0.822 0.414 
Place of Birth YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Observation 15,033 14,661 14,151 13,801   153,222 148,793 149,368 144,008 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 8 2000 DID Estimation by Quartile and Regional Subgroup 
   Black          White     
Quartile Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
High X Cohort4850 0.190* 0.074*** 0.027* -0.021  -0.011 -0.000 0.002 0.004 
 (0.094) (0.013) (0.014) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.005) (0.002) (0.015) 
High X Cohort5153 0.241*** 0.089*** 0.035** -0.019  0.004 0.019*** 0.003 -0.010 
 (0.087) (0.017) (0.013) (0.034)  (0.035) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
High X Cohort5456 0.310*** 0.144*** 0.043*** -0.021  0.007 0.021*** 0.010*** -0.021** 
 (0.074) (0.011) (0.011) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) 
High X Cohort5759 0.321*** 0.129*** 0.044*** -0.038  -0.029 -0.007 -0.012*** -0.037*** 
  (0.092) (0.014) (0.012) (0.032)   (0.032) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) 
Mid X Cohort4850 -0.012 0.064*** 0.032** -0.011  -0.064*** -0.006** 0.004*** 0.007 
 (0.101) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.012) 
Mid X Cohort5153 0.152 0.076*** 0.037*** -0.000  -0.031* 0.008*** 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.100) (0.014) (0.011) (0.026)  (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) 
Mid X Cohort5456 0.192* 0.132*** 0.052*** -0.003  -0.050*** 0.012*** 0.002 -0.022*** 
 (0.103) (0.011) (0.008) (0.029)  (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Mid X Cohort5759 0.278** 0.117*** 0.051*** -0.009  -0.059*** -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.030** 
 (0.114) (0.014) (0.014) (0.027)  (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) 
R-squared 0.144 0.733 0.774 0.277   0.131 0.752 0.776 0.391 
Place of Birth YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Observation 14,236 14,028 13,684 13,233   137,620 134,929 134,928 130,255 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 9  DID Estimation by Political Change     
  1990     2000   
 Black White   Black White 
Low Competition X Cohort4850 0.046 -0.005  0.058 -0.008 
 (0.042) (0.009)  (0.041) (0.011) 
Low Competition X Cohort5153 0.103** -0.007  0.062 -0.010 
 (0.042) (0.009)  (0.040) (0.015) 
Low Competition X Cohort5456 0.090** 0.013  0.130*** 0.009 
 (0.037) (0.013)  (0.030) (0.012) 
Low Competition X Cohort5759 0.110** 0.005  0.090** -0.027* 
  (0.046) (0.009)   (0.039) (0.013) 
High Competition X Cohort4850 0.107*** 0.013*  -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.007)  (0.052) (0.008) 
High Competition X Cohort5153 0.092** 0.015  0.063* -0.012 
 (0.041) (0.009)  (0.037) (0.011) 
High Competition X Cohort5456 0.103** 0.020**  0.077* -0.009 
 (0.044) (0.010)  (0.039) (0.009) 
High Competition X Cohort5759 0.119** 0.012  0.095* -0.016 
 
(0.047) (0.014)  (0.052) (0.012) 
R-squared 0.108 0.131   0.084 0.110 
Place of Birth YES YES  YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES  YES YES 
Controls YES YES  YES YES 
Observation 57,646 595,391   55,181 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 10  DID Estimation by Political Change and Regional Subgroup     
  1990     2000   
 Black White   Black White 
(High Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort4850 0.053 -0.008   0.064 -0.009 
 (0.043) (0.009)  (0.040) (0.012) 
(High Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5153 0.108** -0.010  0.080** -0.006 
 (0.043) (0.010)  (0.036) (0.016) 
(High Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5456 0.097** 0.005  0.139*** 0.013 
 (0.037) (0.012)  (0.028) (0.013) 
(High Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5759 0.113** 0.001  0.091** -0.029* 
  (0.047) (0.008)   (0.040) (0.015) 
(High Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort4850 0.088*** -0.015***   0.097** 0.011** 
 (0.029) (0.003)  (0.040) (0.004) 
(High Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5153 0.095*** 0.003  0.177*** 0.043*** 
 (0.031) (0.005)  (0.027) (0.007) 
(High Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5456 0.085*** -0.028***  0.109*** 0.025*** 
 (0.030) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.006) 
(High Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5759 0.192*** 0.000  0.182*** 0.022*** 
  (0.041) (0.007)   (0.032) (0.005) 
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Table 10  DID Estimation by Political Change and Regional Subgroup     
(Mid Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort4850 -0.107*** 0.017***   -0.032 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.003)  (0.039) (0.004) 
(Mid Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5153 -0.002 0.020***  -0.230*** -0.042*** 
 (0.030) (0.004)  (0.026) (0.007) 
(Mid Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5456 -0.052* 0.077***  -0.021 -0.031*** 
 (0.029) (0.005)  (0.025) (0.007) 
(Mid Slavery and Low Competition) X Cohort5759 0.035 0.040***  0.073** -0.009* 
  (0.039) (0.007)   (0.031) (0.005) 
(Mid Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort4850 0.111*** 0.016**   -0.024 -0.005 
 (0.036) (0.007)  (0.052) (0.008) 
(Mid Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5153 0.091** 0.016  0.043 -0.018* 
 (0.044) (0.010)  (0.035) (0.011) 
(Mid Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5456 0.107** 0.026***  0.074* -0.013 
 (0.048) (0.008)  (0.043) (0.009) 
(Mid Slavery and High Competition) X Cohort5759 0.103** 0.013  0.080 -0.021 
  (0.045) (0.016)   (0.055) (0.013) 
R-squared 0.108 0.131  0.084 0.110 
Place of Birth YES YES  YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES  YES YES 
Controls YES YES  YES YES 
Observation 57,646 595,391   55,181 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and industry. 
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Table 11 Linear Probability Regression Estimation for Moving Decision 
Panel A  Sample in 1990  
Dependent Mover 
 Black  White 
 South Non-South South Non-South 
Grade>=12 0.120*** 0.079*** 0.125*** 0.094*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.026 0.006 0.009 0.004 
Observation 55,501 32,647 198,056 748,357 
Panel B Sample in 2000 
Dependent Mover 
 
Black  White 
 South Non-South South Non-South 
Grade>=12 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.135*** 0.100*** 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.0203 0.004 0.008 0.003 
Observation 54,641 33,112 183,832 699,652 
Note: Number in the parentheses is robust standard error. *** indicates 1 % significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Cohort fixed effect is considered in 
the estimation.  
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Table 12 Proportion of the movers to the whole locally-born sample by education  
Panel A  Sample in 1990 
 Black  White 
 
South-born Non-South born 
 
South-born Non-South born 
Grade<12 5.25% 2.86% 
 
2.87% 1.89% 
 
(20.49%) (10.35%) 
 
(13.38%) (6.30%) 
Grade>=12 29.22% 31.95% 
 
28.87% 36.61% 
 
(79.51%) (89.65%) 
 
(86.62%) (93.70%) 
Panel B Sample in 2000 
 Black  White 
 
South-born Non-South born 
 
South-born Non-South born 
Grade<12 4.47% 2.85% 
 
2.26% 1.61% 
 
(16.83%) (9.29%) 
 
(10.66%) (5.03%) 
Grade>=12 31.88% 35.51% 
 
30.35% 39.22% 
  (83.17%) (90.69%) 
 
(89.34%) (94.97%) 
Note: Number not in the parentheses is the proportion of movers in the same education group. 
For example, the proportion of Southern-born black who had grade higher than 12 is (number of 
Southern-born well-educated black movers)/ (number of Southern-born well-educated black).  
Number in the parentheses is the proportion of movers to the whole sample. For example, the 
proportion of Southern-born black who had grade higher than 12 is (number of well-educated 
Southern-born black movers)/ (total number of Southern-born black).   
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Table 13 Estimation Considering State Labour Supply  
  1990     2000 
 
 
Black White   Black White 
State Labour Supply  0.016 0.002   -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.015) (0.006)   (0.010) (0.007) 
South X Cohort4850 0.074** 0.008 
 
0.023 -0.005 
 
(0.034) (0.006) 
 
(0.045) (0.007) 
South X Cohort5153 0.089** 0.011 
 
0.061* -0.010 
 
(0.037) (0.008) 
 
(0.033) (0.011) 
South X Cohort5456 0.095*** 0.021** 
 
0.101*** -0.000 
 
(0.035) (0.009) 
 
(0.030) (0.010) 
South X Cohort5759 0.110** 0.014 
 
0.092** -0.019* 
  (0.044) (0.011)   (0.040) (0.010) 
R-squared 0.106 0.122 
 
0.082 0.108 
Place of Birth YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Observation 56,919 559,367   54,756 506,184 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table 14 Estimation Considering State Labour Supply by Regional Subgroup 
  1990     2000   
 
Black White   Black White 
State Labour Supply  0.015 0.002   -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.016) (0.006)   (0.009) (0.007) 
High X Cohort4850 0.053 -0.005   0.066 -0.005 
 
(0.038) (0.008) 
 
(0.041) (0.011) 
High X Cohort5153 0.096** -0.002 
 
0.091** 0.003 
 
(0.041) (0.009) 
 
(0.036) (0.016) 
High X Cohort5456 0.092** 0.004 
 
0.131*** 0.017 
 
(0.034) (0.013) 
 
(0.026) (0.012) 
High X Cohort5759 0.119** 0.006 
 
0.104** -0.018 
  (0.047) (0.008)   (0.041) (0.015) 
Mid X Cohort4850 0.100*** 0.017** 
 
-0.031 -0.004 
 
(0.036) (0.006) 
 
(0.051) (0.008) 
Mid X Cohort5153 0.082* 0.019* 
 
0.025 -0.018 
 
(0.044) (0.010) 
 
(0.042) (0.011) 
Mid X Cohort5456 0.099** 0.033*** 
 
0.065 -0.012 
 
(0.047) (0.010) 
 
(0.041) (0.010) 
Mid X Cohort5759 0.100** 0.019 
 
0.078 -0.019 
  (0.046) (0.016)   (0.054) (0.012) 
R-squared 0.106 0.122 
 
0.082 0.108 
Place of Birth YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Controls YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Observation 56,919 559,367   54,756 506,184 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of Wage by Regional Subgroup and Cohorts 
Panel A Black 
Year  1980   1990   2000  
 Cohort High 
Non- 
South 
Diff High 
Non- 
South 
Diff High 
Non- 
South 
Diff 
4547 15.2 18.9 -3.7 16 22.1 -6.1 17.8 23.9 -6.1 
4850 14.1 17.1 -3.0 15.7 20.9 -5.2 18.6 23.4 -4.8 
5153 12.5 15.1 -2.6 14.8 19.1 -4.3 18.0 22.2 -4.2 
5456 10.8 12.3 -1.5 13.5 17.6 -4.1 17.1 20.7 -3.6 
5759 7.8 8.4 -0.6 12.5 15.6 -3.1 15.8 19.6 -3.8 
Panel B White 
Year  1980   1990   2000  
 Cohort High 
Non- 
South 
Diff High 
Non- 
South 
Diff High 
Non- 
South 
Diff 
4547 22.7 25.2 -2.5 26.5 29.9 -3.4 28.6 31.2 -2.6 
4850 20.9 22.5 -1.6 25.4 28.5 -3.1 29.3 31.2 -1.9 
5153 18.3 19.6 -1.3 23.8 26.5 -2.7 28.3 30.4 -2.1 
5456 15.1 15.9 -0.8 22.1 24.7 -2.6 27.5 29.7 -2.2 
5759 11.0 10.9 0.1 19.9 22.6 -2.7 25.9 29.0 -3.1 
Panel C Black 
Year  1980   1990   2000  
 Cohort Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff 
4547 16.3 18.9 -2.6 17.3 22.1 -4.8 19.7 23.9 -4.2 
4850 14.9 17.1 -2.2 16.8 20.9 -4.1 19 23.4 -4.4 
5153 13.7 15.1 -1.4 16.0 19.1 -3.1 18.8 22.2 -3.4 
5456 11.4 12.3 -0.9 14.6 17.6 -3.0 18.1 20.7 -2.6 
5759 8.0 8.4 -0.4 13.1 15.6 -2.5 17.1 19.6 -2.5 
Panel D White 
Year  1980   1990   2000  
 Cohort Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff Mid 
Non- 
South 
Diff 
4547 22.7 25.2 -2.5 25.8 29.9 -4.1 28.8 31.2 -2.4 
4850 20.4 22.5 -2.1 25.1 28.5 -3.4 29 31.2 -2.2 
5153 18.3 19.6 -1.3 23.7 26.5 -2.8 28.1 30.4 -2.3 
5456 14.9 15.9 -1.0 21.9 24.7 -2.8 27.4 29.7 -2.3 
5759 10.7 10.9 -0.2 19.8 22.6 -2.8 26.3 29.0 -2.7 
Notes:  This table reports mean wages by pooled 3-year age cohorts for Black and White men 
over 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census waves. Units are given in thousands of dollars and wages have 
been deflated by the US consumer price index (1982-1984==100).  “High” refers to the formerly 
high slavery states. Middle refers to the formerly middle slavery states.  
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Table A2 DDD Estimation 
Year 1980 1990 2000 
B-W X South X Cohort48-50 0.001 0.068* 0.035 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.044) 
B-W X South X Cohort51-53 -0.022 0.089** 0.072** 
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.033) 
B-W X South X Cohort54-56 0.018 0.077** 0.109*** 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.031) 
B-W X South X Cohort57-59 0.040 0.103** 0.112*** 
 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.041) 
R-squared 0.208 0.161 0.133 
Place of Birth YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observation 753,534 653,037 592,913 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table A3 DDD Estimation by Regional Subgroup  
Year 1980 1990 2000 
B-W X High X Cohort48-50 -0.003 0.064 0.078* 
 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.041) 
B-W X High X Cohort51-53 -0.029 0.110** 0.090** 
 
(0.035) (0.045) (0.037) 
B-W X High X Cohort54-56 0.019 0.090** 0.124*** 
 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031) 
B-W X High X Cohort57-59 0.057 0.121** 0.126*** 
  (0.051) (0.046) (0.043) 
B-W X Mid X Cohort48-50 0.003 0.082** -0.016 
 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.050) 
B-W X Mid X Cohort51-53 -0.009 0.069 0.044 
 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.037) 
B-W X Mid X Cohort54-56 0.017 0.068 0.085** 
 
(0.037) (0.046) (0.038) 
B-W X Mid X Cohort57-59 0.015 0.086* 0.098* 
 
(0.036) (0.044) (0.053) 
R-squared 0.209 0.161 0.133 
Place of Birth YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES 
Observation 753,534 653,037 592,913 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance 
level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include education, occupation and 
industry. 
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Table A4 DID Estimation By Using Continuous Slavery Ratio 
 Black White 
Year 1990 2000 1990 2000 
          
Slavery X Cohort4850 0.173** 0.104 0.014 -0.013 
 (0.077) (0.100) (0.016) (0.018) 
Slavery X Cohort5153 0.265*** 0.196** 0.006 -0.014 
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.022) (0.026) 
Slavery X Cohort5456 0.231*** 0.275*** 0.027 0.009 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.025) (0.024) 
Slavery X Cohort5759 0.302*** 0.202** 0.015 -0.058** 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.027) (0.026) 
     
R-squared 0.108 0.083 0.131 0.110 
Cohort Effect YES YES YES YES 
Education YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Observation 57,646 55,181 595,391 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include 
education, occupation and industry. 
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Table A5 DID Estimation By Using Continuous Political Competition  
  Black White  
Year 1990 2000 1990 2000 
          
(Political Competition) X 
Cohort4850 -0.220 -0.228 0.009 0.020 
 (0.187) (0.163) (0.035) (0.052) 
(Political Competition) X 
Cohort5153 -0.375** -0.233 -0.003 0.022 
 (0.169) (0.154) (0.044) (0.070) 
(Political Competition) X 
Cohort5456 -0.328** -0.555*** -0.089* -0.027 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.046) (0.055) 
(Political Competition) X 
Cohort5759 -0.425** -0.301 -0.042 0.085 
 (0.191) (0.187) (0.050) (0.069) 
     
R-squared 0.108 0.083 0.131 0.110 
Cohort Effect YES YES YES YES 
Education YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Observation 57,646 55,181 595,391 537,732 
Note: Number in the parentheses is the standard error clustered by the place of birth. *** 
indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% 
significance level. Regressions are weighted by sample weights. Controls include 
education, occupation and industry. 
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Chapter 2 Hate Crime and Victory of Obama 
1. Introduction 
 
Hate crime, motivated by racial, sexual or other prejudices, may occur in the context of an 
increase in tension or conflict among different social groups, and can undermine social 
cohesion and integration.27 At worst, hate crimes may involve property damage or physical 
violence.28 Among race incidents in the US, the majority have been perpetrated against black 
people, who form the largest racial minority in the US.29 Figures 1 to 3 show the patterns of 
total, anti-black only, and anti-white only hate crimes in the US from 2000 to 2012. The 
figures display a clear fall in total and anti-black hate crimes other than anti-white hate crime 
after Democratic candidate Barack Obama won the US presidential election in November 
2008.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
    Obama’s election win was considered a triumph along the path of reducing inequality and 
empowering the black community. A common recent perception is that Obama’s presidency 
led to a lessening of black-white tensions. In fact, laboratory-based studies such as Plant et 
al. (2009) and Columb and Plant (2011) indicate that exposure to Obama, a positive counter-
stereotype exemplar, has decreased whites’ prejudice against black people. In addition, 
Welch and Sigelman (2011) draw a similar conclusion from American National Election 
                                                          
27 The legal definition of hate crime as provided by the FBI is that “a hate crime as a criminal offense against 
a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.” The measurement of hate crime used in this paper is 
hate crime incidents per 100,000 persons.   
28 There are lots of examples, ranging from Hindu-Muslim riots in India in 1980s, to more recent Buddhist-
Muslim riots in Myanmar and the Charlottesville riots in the US in 2017. 
29 From FBI Statistics from 2005 to 2012: about 53 percent of hate crimes were motivated by racial bias; 
among the racial biased hate crimes, about 69 percent were triggered by anti-black bias.  
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Studies. Given the previous findings, I use hate crime data to test whether Obama’s win in 
the 2008 election had a significant impact on total and anti-race hate crime in the US.  
    To explore this idea, I use the variation in hate crimes across different political regions 
before and after Obama’s win. To identify the political regions, I classify States into “Blue 
States”, which supported a Democratic candidate in the presidential election of 2008, and 
“Red States”, which supported a Republican presidential candidate in 2008. This 
classification captures the political, economic and demographic differences between Blue 
and Red States. For instance, Blue States generally have stronger economies than Red 
States.30 Accordingly, this paper focuses on whether total and anti-race hate crimes, 
particularly anti-black crime, exhibit a different pattern between Blue and Red States after 
Obama came to power.  
    I argue that after Obama’s win, anti-black and total hate crimes declined relatively more 
in Blue States than in Red States. Since Obama was from the Democratic Party, his salient 
and successful example is likely to have changed how black people are perceived by white 
people in Blue States, leading to greater tolerance and respect. I would refer to this effect as 
Obama Effect. As a result, anti-black hate crime would fall. Furthermore, total hate crime 
would also fall because the majority of hate crimes are those perpetrated against black 
people. On the other hand, in Red States Obama’s victory might not affect negative attitudes 
about black people, because Obama was from the opposing party. In addition, the Tea Party 
Movement (hereafter, ‘TPM’), which emerged shortly after Obama’s victory in the 2008 
election and has been associated with the Republican Party, organised a series of protests 
against Obama’s administration. Studies (e.g. Knowles et al. (2013), Tope et al. (2015)) 
show that racial resentment and racial prejudice are highly associated with this movement. 
This suggests that the TPM might weaken the Obama Effect in Red States. Consequently, 
anti-black and total hate crimes would not decrease in those States.     
    Moreover, among Blue and Red States, there exist States that supported the Democratic 
Party in both the 2004 and the 2008 presidential election (hereafter, ‘Democratic Party 
Always States’), States that switched political party preference (hereafter, ‘Swing States’), 
and States that always supported the Republican Party (hereafter, ‘Republican Party Always 
States’). Thus, this paper will further argue that anti-black and total hate crimes would 
exhibit a significant drop in the Democratic Party Always States rather than the Swing States. 
Hate crimes in Swing States might not be affected as much by the Obama Effect since the 
                                                          
30 Shin and Webber (2014) discuss details about the difference between Blue and Red States. 
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number of people who supported the Democratic Party and Republican Party was similar for 
both.   
    Practically, my empirical design utilizes the sample of monthly hate crime data for each 
State reported by the FBI between 2005 and 2012. I use a simple difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach. The advantage of the DID approach is that it can rule out the level 
difference across the groups and show how hate crimes in Blue States behaved differently 
to those in Red States during Obama’s presidency. The empirical results indicate that total 
and anti-black hate crimes significantly declined in Blue States relative to Red States after 
2008. The results also show that relative to the Republican Party Always States, there was a 
significant decline in both total and anti-black hate crimes in the Democratic Party Always 
States.  
    In addition, I examine which factors such as black-white education ratio, the proportion 
of black people, GDP per capita, and the number of police, play a role in the observed decline 
in total and anti-black hate crimes. The results show that the black-white education ratio, 
more than any other factor, may explain the decline in anti-black and total hate crimes in 
Democratic Party Always States.31 Therefore the Obama Effect is stronger in Democratic 
Party Always States and is associated with a higher black-white education ratio. 
    However, the findings above may be related to two alternative possible explanations. 
Firstly, the results could have been driven by the switch from a Republican (Democratic) to 
a Democratic (Republican) president as a new president might put efforts to reduce the hate 
crime rate to signal the citizens that the alleviation of racial or gender conflicts. Regarding 
this concern, I consider hate crimes under each of the political parties between 1997 and 
2004, which also saw a party alternation, compared to the period between 2005 and 2012.32 
The results indicate that relative to the States that supported the Republican Party during this 
period, there was no significant change in hate crimes in the States that supported the 
Democratic Party and the Swing states after Bush won the election in 2000. Second, the 
previous results may be because of a shift in the attitudes of police towards race or reporting 
crime. Regarding the police’s racial attitude, DellaVigna (2010) indicates that Obama Effect 
did not have any effect on it. As for the police’s attitude towards reporting crime, if this were 
                                                          
31 In this paper, the black-white education ratio is measured by the proportion of well-educated population 
among black people and the proportion of well-educated population among white people. The well-educated 
population refers to the people whose educational attainments at 12th grade and higher. The higher ratio 
implies a lower education gap between blacks and whites.   
32 Between 1997 and 2004, Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush were from different political parties and 
were both white. Thus, the examination of hate crimes during this period can show the effect of political 
alternation on hate crimes.    
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the case, we shall expect that the change of police’s attitudes towards the crime reporting 
could not only affect hate crime records but also violent crime, and property crime. To 
examine this concern, I adopt other types of crimes such as violent and property crimes, 
between 2005 and 2012. From the empirical results, I do not observe any clear change in 
pattern for these crimes in the Democratic Party Always States. Therefore, taken together, 
the decline in hate crime, particularly the total and anti-black type, after the 2008 presidential 
election can be seen as due to the Obama Effect.  
    This paper adds to the psychology and sociology literature that discusses the impact of the 
Obama Effect on the perception of blacks by whites in the US (e.g. Plant et al. (2009); 
Columb and Plant (2011); Welch and Lee (2011)). This study extends the literature on the 
relationship between economic outcomes and the Obama Effect (e.g. Marx et al. (2009); 
DellaVigna (2010)). In addition, This paper also contributes to the growing body of hate 
crime research, which tends to examine which factors (such as hate group or terror attacks) 
may affect hate crime propagation (e.g. Ryan and Leeson (2011); Hanes and Machin (2014)).  
In particular, this study considers the relationship between the Obama Effect and hate crimes. 
Distinct from the studies that find no Obama Effect on economic outcomes (e.g. DellaVigna 
(2010)), this paper confirms that Obama’s win did cause total and anti-black hate crimes to 
decline, particularly in the States where the majority supported Obama in the election.  
    The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes 
relevant issues in the lives of black people in the US. Section 4 discusses the development 
of related hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the data and empirical model specification.  
Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and Section 7 concludes.    
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This study relates to the literature on whether the election of Obama as President changed 
whites’ perceptions of black people, or economic outcomes for black people. Regarding the 
literature about whether exposure to Obama can result in a decline in anti-black prejudice by 
white people, laboratory-based studies do find a positive impact on racial attitudes. For 
instance, Plant et al. (2009) find that participants who hold Obama in mind as a role model, 
either as a positive black exemplar or political figure (a president), may show a dramatic 
reduction in implicit anti-black prejudice. Columb and Plant (2011) also confirm that 
participants who were exposed to negative black exemplars and then Obama show a decrease 
in implicit racial bias relative to those in negative exemplars only condition. In addition to 
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the laboratory-based findings, Welch and Sigelman (2011) utilize data from American 
National Election Studies (ANES) and find that negative stereotypes of blacks were weaker 
among younger whites under the election of Obama. This finding implies that the stereotype 
could continue to disappear in the future.  
    The Obama Effect may also influence economic outcomes for black people. For example, 
it could increase academic performance by counteracting internalised negative stereotypes 
in black people (Steele and Aronson (1995)). Marx et al. (2009) find the Obama Effect is 
beneficial for academic performance among black people because it reduces the negative 
effects of stereotype threat. DellaVigna (2010) utilizes an event study approach to examine 
if the Obama Effect affects the crime rate and police attitudes. His findings suggest that there 
exists no significant impact on economic outcomes for blacks such as changes to the crime 
rate. As for the examination of police attitudes, he examines racial profiling by the police at 
traffic stops and finds no change. Overall, the author concludes that the Obama Effect may 
not change economic outcomes.  
    Besides the study about the Obama Effect on racial attitudes and economic outcomes, this 
paper is also linked to the literature that examines which factors may be related to hate 
crimes. For instance, Ryan and Leeson (2011) study the relationship between hate groups 
and hate crimes. However, they find no correlation between hate groups and hate crimes. 
Hanes and Machin (2014) evaluate the effect of exogenous terror attacks such as the July 
2005 terror attack in London and the September 2001 terror attack in the US on hate crime 
in the UK. They show that these terror attacks increased hate crimes against Asians and 
Arabs in the UK. The authors argue that the findings may be driven by changes in attitudes 
towards groups such as British Muslims, as a result of media coverage.     
 
3. Black people in the US 
 
Before discussing how changes in hate crimes in US States could be associated with different 
political preferences, I briefly discuss the current circumstances of black people in the US.  
    Average income and educational attainment in the US is lower among black people than 
white people. This racial inequality can be directly traced to black slavery in the US South 
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in the 19th Century (e.g. Bertocchi and Dimico (2014)).33 Even after the Civil War and the 
end of slavery, black people continued to be oppressed via race discrimination in education, 
labour and politics. For example, the Black Codes in the South prevented black people from 
easily moving to other States; Jim Crow laws, although designated “separate but equal”, 
institutionalised discrimination in job searches, education and transportation.  
    Things changed after significant events such as World War I, the Great Depression and 
World War II. These events weakened the resolve of whites in the South to impede progress 
for blacks (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)). Moreover, the Civil Rights movement during 
the 1950s and 1960s increased black activism towards achieving equality. This movement 
drove the US Government to finally implement laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to reduce labour market discrimination and increase 
political participation.   
    Studies have documented the decline of black-white wage gap as a result of these changes 
(e.g. Donohue and Heckman (1991); Card and Krueger (1992); Ashenfelter et al. (2006); 
Chay et al. (2014); Cheng (2017b)). However, conflicts between blacks and whites may 
prevail because of persistent negative racial stereotypes, leading to tension and in some 
cases, violence. Obama’s historic victory in 2008, becoming the first African-American 
president was an opportunity to change racial attitudes towards black people and bring about 
a decline in race crimes, especially those perpetrated against black people by white people. 
 
4. Hypothesis Development  
 
In this section I develop a hypothesis about that how Obama’s win might have changed the 
pattern of hate crimes across States with different political leanings.  
4.1 Blue and Red States 
4.1.1 Anti-Black and Total Hate Crimes  
 
Finn and Glaser (2010) indicate that the most influential predictor of vote choice in the 2008 
US presidential election was party identity. In addition, studies such as Mas and Moretti 
(2009), Bullock (2010) and Weisberg (2015) point out that there exists little evidence that 
                                                          
33 After three centuries of slavery in the US, northern objections to this practice triggered the Civil War 
between the South and North, which started in 1861 and lasted till 1865. In 1865, the North defeated the 
South and slavery was abolished. 
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racial attitudes could have played a major role in the 2008 presidential election. Weisberg 
(2015) further indicates that the reason why Obama lost votes in 2008 is because of bad 
economic conditions at that time. Accordingly, people chose which candidate to vote for 
mainly because of their own political preferences, and not candidate characteristics such as 
race.34  
    However, after the election, Obama’s race may have played a role in changing racial 
attitudes towards black people, particularly in the Blue States. This phenomenon, where 
people change their attitudes to bring their view into line with the current leadership of the 
party they are aligned with, can be observed across many political evolutions. For example, 
historically it was the Southern Democrats who supported slavery and segregation, and 
Republicans who led the push to eliminate it: when the Republican leadership shifted their 
position, the views of their voters followed. Similarly, the election of a black Democratic 
President shifted attitudes towards black people, especially among Democrat voters. Using 
US General Social Survey data, Figure 4 shows that Democrats thought that blacks had a 
better work attitude after 2008, but Republicans did not.35 36 In line with the findings from 
previous literature (e.g. Plant et al. (2009), Columb and Plant (2011)), this finding may 
suggest that Obama being the first black president affected the white’s negative black 
stereotypes, encouraging a more respectful and tolerant attitude among white Democrat 
voters. Therefore, we would expect to see a reduction in the anti-black hate crimes in 
Democratic States (Blue States) and, since anti-black hate crime forms the majority of total 
hate crime incidents, we expect that the total hate crime rate would also fall following 
Obama’s victory.   
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
 
                                                          
34 Although there may have been some concern that the voters’ decision in the 2008 US presidential election 
was affected by the Obama’s racial identity, this paper will follow the argument of Mas and Moretti (2009), 
Bullock (2010) and Weisberg (2015) and then assume that Obama’s racial identity played no role in the 
voters’ decision in 2008. 
35 The General Social Survey is a national representative survey, which has tracked societal changes in the 
US such as the pattern of racial attitudes, since 1972.  
36 The lower index implies that black people work harder. Figure A1 shows that how black people thought of 
whites’ work attitudes. One can observe that different to white people, both black democrats and republicans 
thought whites were lazier after Obama won the election.  
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    As for white people in Red States, Obama’s win might not affect much their perception 
of black people. This is because Obama is not from the party that they supported, so the race 
of the new President is not so relevant to them. Figure 4 shows that the republicans thought 
that black peoples were lazier after 2008. Moreover, the TPM was mainly opposed to the 
Obama Administration, and mostly supported Republican candidates for office (e.g. 
Madestam, et al. (2013)).37 Skocpol and Williamson (2012) also indicate that most Tea Party 
activities were observed in the Red States. Studies such as Knowles et al. (2013) and Tope 
et al. (2015) further point out that the anti-minority attitude, particularly anti-black, is highly 
associated with TPM membership. Due to these anti-Obama factors, the Obama Effect could 
not have a significant influence on white Republicans’ perceptions. Therefore, there is 
unlikely to be a clear decline in the anti-black and total hate crimes in Red States.38 As a 
result, we should observe that the total and anti-black hate crimes in Blue States relative to 
Red States exhibited a significant decline after Obama’s victory.           
 
4.1.2 Anti-White Hate Crime  
 
The Obama Effect is unlikely to shift anti-white hate crime in Blue States relative to Red 
States. Anti-white hate crime has been low in both Blue and Red States, and as the 
economically and socially powerful majority, white people are less likely to be the target of 
hate crimes. Therefore, there would not exist a clear decline in the anti-white hate crime in 
Blue States relative to Red States after Obama came to power.     
 
4.2 Democratic, Swing, and Republican 
 
With respect to hate crime pattern in the Democratic Party Always States, Swing States and 
Republican Party Always States after Obama came to power, I argue that anti-black and total 
hate crimes might not change much in Swing States relative to Republican Party Always 
States after Obama’s win. This is because Swing States had a similar voting share between 
                                                          
37 TPM could affect white people’s behaviour in both Blue and Red States. However, its effect should be 
higher in Red States since the TPM was mainly against Democratic Party policies. In the appendix, Figures 
A2 and A3 show the average number of Republican politicians associated with the TPM. Relative to Blue (or 
Democratic Party Always) States there are more politicians who are affiliated with the TPM in Red (or 
Republican always) States.   
38 These anti-Obama factors might not affect people much in the Blue States since the most people there are 
pro Democratic Party.  
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the Democratic Party and the Republican Party: anti-Obama factors such as TPM could still 
play a role in affecting the white’s racial attitudes towards black people in these States.39 
Therefore, there would not be an observable decline in the anti-black and total hate crimes 
in Swing States relative to Republican Party Always States after Obama’ win. As for hate 
crimes in the Democratic Party Always States, similar to the argument in section 4.1.1, one 
would anticipate a clear decline in the anti-black as well as in total hate crimes relative to 
Republican Party Always States after Obama’s victory. Following the argument in section 
4.1.2, one would also expect that relative to Republican states, the anti-white hate crime 
would have no change in the Democratic Party Always States and Swing States after 
Obama’s win.  
 
5. Data and Empirical Model  
5.1 Hate Crime Data  
 
This study uses data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), which was created under 
the Hate Crime Act of 1990. This Act requires the Attorney General to collect monthly data 
on crimes showing evidence of racial, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnic prejudices.40 In 
this study, I mainly consider the total, anti-black and anti-white hate crimes for each State 
from 2005 to 2012. The total hate crime rate refers to hate crime incidents motivated by all 
possible prejudices, per 100,000 population. The anti-black and anti-white hate crimes rates 
are incidents against black people and white people per 100, 000 population, respectively.41  
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
5.2.1 Blue vs Red States 
 
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 demonstrate the pattern of total, anti-black and anti-white 
hate crimes in the Blue and Red States from 2005 to 2012, respectively. These figures firstly 
show that total and anti-black hate crimes are higher in the Blue States than the Red States. 
                                                          
39 In the Swing States the average voting share of Democratic Party and Republican Party in 2008 was about 
53 % and 46%, respectively.   
40 The FBI works closely with state authorities to investigate hate crimes. When the investigation is complete, 
the FBI forwards the results to local U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Civil Rights Division at the Department 
of Justice, which decides whether a federal prosecution is warranted. Details are at: 
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-rights/hate-crimes.  
41 The formula of hate crime rate is as follows. State hate crime=(State hate incidents)/(State 
population)*10^5. 
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Moreover, in Figure 5 and Figure 6 we observe a clear decline in total and anti-black hate 
crime in Blue States but not in Red States after the 2008 election. Figure 7 shows that there 
is no difference in anti-white hate crime between Blue and Red States.  
  
[Figure 5 here] 
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
    Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of different types of hate crimes across regions 
and periods. In line with the information in Figure 5-7, total and anti-black hate crimes are 
always higher in Blue States compared to Red States. The reasons why Blue States exhibit 
a higher hate crime rate than Red states could be the demographic difference that exists 
between these two groups. For example, this may be due to a higher population density in 
Blue States relative to Red States.42 The difference in total hate crime between Blue and Red 
States before Obama came to power was 0.078. It then declined to 0.040 after Obama’s win. 
For anti-black hate crime, the differences were 0.031 before and 0.014 after Obama’s win. 
Anti-white hate crime was slightly higher in Red States than Blue States before and after 
Obama was in power. The differences were -0.010 and -0.011, respectively.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
    Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for economic development, demographics, 
education and law and enforcement in Blue and Red States from 2005 to 2012. Relative to 
Red States, Blue States have higher GDP per capita, suggesting better economic conditions 
in Blue States. Blue States have a slightly lower proportion of males and a higher population 
density than Red States. Both of them have a similar proportion of black people. The ratio 
                                                          
42 From our sample, the correlation between hate crime and population density is about 0.3535. The 
population densities of Blue and Red States are 609 persons per square mile and 66 persons per square mile.   
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of proportion of black and proportion of white whose education attendance at 12th grade and 
higher is lower in Blue than Red States, suggesting that racial educational inequality is higher 
in the Blue States. Regarding law and enforcement, which is measured by the number of 
police per 1,000 population, there exists no significant difference between Blue and Red 
States.   
 
[Table 2 here] 
     
5.2.2 Democratic vs Swing vs Republican States 
 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the Democratic Party Always, Swing, and 
Republican Party Always States between 2005 and 2012. Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 
demonstrate the pattern of total, anti-black and anti-white hate crimes among them, 
respectively. Total and anti-black hate crimes are higher in the Democratic Party Always 
States than in the Swing and Republican Party Always States. Moreover, there is no 
difference in anti-white hate crime in the three groups. In addition, the total and anti-black 
hate crimes declined substantially in the Democratic Party Always States relative to the 
Swing and Republican Party Always States after Obama’s win.  
 
[Figure 8 here] 
 
[Figure 9 here] 
 
[Figure 10 here] 
   
    Table 3 shows hate crime statistics across the three political groups. Total and anti-black 
hate crimes are higher in the Democratic Party Always States than in the Swing or 
Republican Party Always States. However, the anti-white crime rate is similar among all 
three political groups. Comparing hate crimes before and after Obama’s win, there was a 
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significant drop in total and anti-black hate crimes in the Democratic Party Always States 
after Obama’s win.   
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
    Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of other characteristics. The economy in 
Democratic Party Always States is better than in others, and the proportion of the black 
population is slightly higher in the Democratic Party Always States than in others. The 
proportion of male population is higher in the Swing and Republican Party Always States 
than in the Democratic Party Always States, while the highest population density is in the 
Democratic Party Always States. Regarding the black-white education ratio, the ratio is 
higher in the Republican Party Always States than in others. As a measure of law and 
enforcement, the number of police per 1,000 population is higher in the Democratic Party 
Always States than in others.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
5.3 Empirical Model 
 
I implement a basic difference-in-differences (DID) approach, using the following empirical 
model,43 
log (1 + 𝐻𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑠𝑚𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿(𝑃 × 𝐵) + 𝑋𝑠𝑦𝛽 + 𝜀𝑠𝑚𝑦                (1)      
where 𝑠 is state, 𝑚 is month, 𝑦 is year, 𝐻𝑎𝑡𝑒 represents hate crime such as total, anti-black 
or anti-white hate crime, 𝑃 indicates the period after Obama’s win (November 2008), 𝐵 is 
the Blue State dummy and 𝑋 is a vector of controls including GDP per capita, proportion of 
black population, proportion of male population, black-white education ratio, population 
density and number of police.44 The parameter of main interest, 𝛿, measures how hate crime 
in Blue States changes relative to Red States before and after Obama’s win. Following the 
                                                          
43 See d’Este (2017) for another example, I use the functional form, log (1 + 𝑥), for the dependent variable.  
44 Instead of using a dummy variable that represents the Blue states, one can also use the voting share of 
Democratic Party in 2008 presidential election in the analysis.   
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argument regarding the Obama Effect, we should expect 𝛿 to be negative and significant in 
the total and anti-black hate crimes.  
    I extend model (1) by considering the case of the three political groups. The revised model 
is as follows. 
log (1 + 𝐻𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑠𝑚𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘(𝑃 × 𝑇𝑘)
2
𝑘=1
+ 𝑋𝑠𝑦𝛽 + 𝜀𝑠𝑚𝑦         (2) 
, where 𝑇1 represents Democratic Party Always States and 𝑇2 represents Swing States. The 
definitions of other variables are the same as in the baseline model. The coefficients of main 
interest in this regression are 𝛿𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, which measures the changes in hate crimes in 
Democratic Party Always States and Swing States relative to the Republican Party Always 
States before and after Obama came to power. Again, we should expect that the total and 
anti-black hate crimes in the Democratic Party Always States would have a significant 
decline relative to the Republican Party Always States after Obama’s win. Finally, please 
note that the level differences in hate crime across these groups are necessarily differenced 
out as part of the DID model. That is, the level differences in hate crimes in different groups 
would not affect the estimation results. Hence, the 𝛿 and 𝛿𝑘 parameters in model (1) and (2) 
can capture the post-Obama differential shift in the level of hate crime.  
6. Empirical Results 
 
This section discusses the results of the empirical models. In the baseline results, I will show 
the results regarding the two or three political groups’ samples and see if the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis. In the heterogeneity analysis, I mainly focus on the sample 
of three political groups to examine which factors such as black-white education ratio, 
proportion of black population, number of police, and GDP per capita may affect hate crime 
after Obama’s win. Since there may exist other possible explanations for the findings, I will 
again use the sample of three political groups to examine whether the possible explanations 
can drive the main findings.  
 
6.1 Baseline Results 
6.1.1 Results with no Fixed Effect 
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Table 5 and Table 6 show the estimation results of model (1) and model (2) without the fixed 
effects. From Table 5, we can observe that the interaction coefficient is negative across these 
three types of hate crimes. Although most of the estimates are not significant, we still can 
observe that the magnitudes of coefficients are larger in the total and anti-black hate crime 
sample than in the anti-white hate crime sample. This may imply that that relative to the Red 
States, total and anti-black hate crimes could decline after Obama won the election. 
Regarding the results from Table 6, one can see the relative to the Republican Party Always 
States, the total and anti-black hate crime declined significantly in the Democratic Party 
Always States when considering other control variables in the estimation.  
[Table 5 here] 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
6.1.2 Results with Fixed Effect 
6.1.2.1 Blue vs Red States 
 
Table 7 shows the baseline empirical results of model (1). We can observe that the 
coefficients of main interest are negative and significant in the total and anti-black hate 
crimes but not in the anti-white hate crime sample. This suggests that total and anti-black 
hate crimes in the Blue States declined significantly after Obama won the 2008 election. As 
for the magnitudes of coefficients, we can find, for example, that the estimates from model 
with controls are about 3.7 % and 1.7%, respectively.4546  
 
[Table 7 here] 
                                                          
45 As there may exist different trends in reporting hate crime between Blue and Red states, I consider the 
inclusion of group specific trends in the analysis. The results as shown in Table A1 are similar to the findings 
in Table 7. Note that the magnitudes of coefficients in the anti-black hate crime model across the trend and 
non-trend cases are similar to each other. But, the overall estimate becomes less significant in the model with 
trend because the standard error increases (from 0.008 to 0.011).  However, the model for total hate crimes 
remains significant with the coefficient not changing across the two types of model.  
46 Instead of using the log (1+hate) functional form, I also use hate crime rate as a dependent variable in the 
analysis. The estimation results reported in Table A2 are similar to those found in Table 7. In addition, I also 
estimate models that use the state Democratic voting share in 2008 presidential election as a measure of 
treatment intensity in the DID estimation. The results for this model are shown in Table A3 and Table A4 are 
consistent with the main findings from the paper.   
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6.1.2.2 Democrat Always vs Swing vs Republican Always 
 
Table 8 contains the results for the sample of three political groups: Democratic Party 
Always, Swing and Republican Party Always States. The findings indicate that relative to 
Republican Party Always States, there exists a significant decline in total and anti-black hate 
crimes in Democratic Party Always States after Obama’s win. The magnitudes of estimates 
from the model with controls are about 4.7 % and 2.3 %, respectively. Furthermore, there is 
no significant drop in anti-white hate crime in the Democratic Party Always and Swing 
States relative to the Republican Party Always States.4748  
 
[Table 8 here] 
   
6.2 Heterogeneity Analysis  
 
In this section I discuss which variables, such as black-white education ratio, proportion of 
black population, number of police, and GDP per capita, play a role in the decline in hate 
crime after Obama’s win. These four variables represent different State characteristics. The 
black-white education ratio measures relative social and economic status. A higher ratio 
implies that the economic and social status between blacks and whites is closer. The 
proportion of black population may represent the collective power of blacks in each state. 
The number of police and GDP per capita can be proxies for general law and enforcement, 
and economic conditions in each state, respectively. I use the sample of three political groups 
and implement a triple difference (DDD) to do the analysis. The results from Table 9 show 
that the black-white education ratio may be more influential than other variables in the 
decline in total and anti-black hate crime in the Democratic Party Always States.  
 
[Table 9 here] 
                                                          
47 As for the three group case, the findings reported in Table A5 are similar to the findings in Table 8. 
Moreover, similar to the findings from Table A1, one can also observe the standard error from the anti-black 
hate crime model with trend is larger than the anti-black hate crime model without trend.   
48 The hate crime rate is also used as a dependent variable in the analysis and the results are shown in Table 
A6. Again, the results are similar to the findings from Table 8.  
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6.3 Some Concerns 
 
There are alternative explanations for the findings above. For instance, the previous results 
could be driven by the political alternation, since changing the political party in power might 
shift attitudes towards hate crime. Moreover, the previous findings could be due to a change 
in police practices regarding the report of criminal incidents. Below I discuss whether the 
previous findings are attributable to these alternative explanations.  
 
6.3.1 Political Alternation  
 
Did changing from a Republican (Democratic) to a Democratic (Republican) President 
change racial attitudes? If this were the case, we should observe a change in the incidence 
of hate crime every time a new president was elected whose ideology was different to that 
of the previous president. Between 1997 and 2004 the US was led by presidents from 
different political parties, so I use this period to examine whether hate crime incidence 
changed in the Democratic Party Always or Swing States during this period after the new 
president (Bush, Republican) came to power.49 The results, shown in Table 10, indicate that 
there existed no significant change in hate crime in the Democratic Party Always or Swing 
States relative to the Republican Party Always States after Bush’s election. Hence, these 
findings suggest the results from the sample between 2005 and 2012 are unlikely to have 
been caused by the changing from a Republican to a Democratic president.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
 
6.3.2 Police Attitudes  
 
The other concern is that the decline in hate crime after Obama came to power may be due 
to a shift in police behaviour related, for example, to changes of racial attitude or attitude 
towards reporting crimes. In fact, DellaVigna (2010) examines whether racial profiling by 
                                                          
49 Here, the Democratic (Republican) Party Always States are the States that supported Democratic 
(Republican) Party in 1996 and 2000 presidential election. The Swing States are the States that changed their 
political party support in 1996 and 2000 election.  
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the police in traffic stops was changed by the Obama Effect. His empirical findings indicate 
that Obama Effect might not play a role in the police’s racial attitude. The findings from 
DellaVigna (2010) therefore provide us an important piece of evidence that the attitudes of 
police towards the race did not change even if Obama won the election. However, if the 
attitude of police to criminal behaviours did change due to other unobservable factors such 
as the process of reporting crime, one might expect that other types of crimes such as violent 
or property crimes in the Democratic Party Always or Swing States would also have changed 
significantly after Obama’s win. Thus, to further examine this concern, I use state level 
violent and property crimes to examine this concern. The results in Table 11 show that there 
was no significant change in violent and property crime in the Democratic Party Always or 
Swing States relative to the Republican Party Always States after Obama came to power. 
Moreover, I utilize different types of violent and property crimes to see if they would change 
after Obama’s win. Again, results in Table 12 and 13 suggest that there is no differential 
effect for the Democratic Party Always and Swing States after Obama’s victory. Hence, 
previous findings that suggest a decline in total and anti-black hate crime are not related to 
the police’s attitude towards reporting crime after Obama came to power.50 
 
[Table 11 here] 
 
[Table 12 here] 
 
[Table 13 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper studies whether the Obama Effect could have played a role in influencing hate 
crimes after the 2008 presidential election. The hypothesis developed in this paper suggests 
that total and anti-black hate crimes could decline relatively more in Blue States (or 
Democratic Party Always States) than in Red States (or Republican Party Always States) 
after Obama’s win. Consistent with the hypothesis, the empirical findings suggest that the 
                                                          
50 Since the violent and property crimes are yearly basis data, I define the post variable as the year after 2009. 
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decline of total and anti-black hate crime is mainly in the Blue States, particularly in the 
Democratic Party Always States, after Obama’s success. Thus, the findings suggest that 
Obama’s win could have played an important role in affecting hate crimes in the US.  
    The findings also have implications in terms of race relations and hate crime, since black 
people are usually considered to have lower educational attainments and income relative to 
white people in the US. Obama to be the American’s first black president can be headed as 
a “post-racial” era in the US. His achievement might make people, particularly white people, 
rethink the race relations and change their racial attitudes towards black people. 
Consequently, the total and anti-black hate crimes change in the “post-racial” era. As for 
future research, it will be interesting to see whether the Obama Effect still persists even after 
the Trump presidency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
Figure 1 Total Hate Crime Rate from 2000 to 201251  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Anti-Black Hate Crime Rate from 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Note that the hate crime rate in the figures across the paper is 5-month moving average of hate crime. As 
there exists lots of noise in the raw hate crime data, it might be difficult to show the hate crime pattern. Thus, 
the smooth moving average hate crime plot may provide the readers more information regarding the hate 
crime pattern.  
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Figure 3 Anti-White Hate Crime Rate from 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 4 White Peoples’ Perception about Black Peoples’ Work Attitude from 2000 to 
201252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 The higher index means that white people perceive black people to be lazier. 
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Figure 5 Total Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Group53 
 
 
Figure 6 Anti-Black Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 The horizontal line in Figure 5 and 6 measures the average of hate crime of the Blue States before and after 
Obama’s victory.  
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Figure 7 Anti-White Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Hate Crimes per 100,000 persons 
 Period: 2005/1-2008/10 
 Blue States Red States Difference 
Total 0.288 0.209 0.078*** 
Anti-Black 0.097 0.066 0.031*** 
Anti-White 0.026 0.036 -0.010** 
 Period: 2008/11-2012/12 
 Blue States Red States Difference 
Total 0.240 0.200 0.040*** 
Anti-Black 0.075 0.061 0.014*** 
Anti-White 0.019 0.030 -0.011*** 
Note: Data Source: Uniform Crime Report (UCR) program of FBI. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Mean test with unequal variance. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Other Variables 
 Period: 2005-2012 
 Blue States Red States Difference 
GDP per capita (thousands) 53.543 43.299 10.242*** 
Black ratio (%) 11.653 11.544 0.109 
Male ratio (%) 49.061 49.629 -0.568*** 
Population density (per square 
mile) 
639.189 63.639 575.550*** 
B-W ratio of education 0.908 0.934 - 0.026*** 
Police (per 1,000 population) 3.474 3.472 0.002 
Note: Data Source: Author’s collection. *** indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 
5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance level. Mean test with unequal 
variance. 
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Figure 8 Total Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Sub-Group54 
 
 
Figure 9 Anti-Black Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Sub-Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 The horizontal line in Figure 8 and 9 measures the average of hate crime of the Democratic Party Always 
States before and after Obama’s victory. 
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Figure 10 Anti-White Hate Crime Rate from 2005 to 2012 by Political Sub-Group 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Hate Crimes per 100,000 persons  
 Period: 2005/1-2008/10 
 Democratic Swing Republican 
Total 0.339 0.177 0.209 
Anti-Black 0.113 0.063 0.066 
Anti-White 0.029 0.020 0.036 
 Period: 2008/11-2012/12 
 Democratic Swing Republican 
Total 0.285 0.146 0.200 
Anti-Black 0.087 0.051 0.061 
Anti-White 0.021 0.015 0.030 
Data Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR). 
 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables 
 Period: 2005-2012 
 Democratic Swing Republican 
GDP per capita (thousands) 57.267 45.683 43.299 
Black ratio (%) 12.044 10.831 11.544 
Male ratio (%) 48.852 49.505 49.629 
Population density (per square mile) 871.550 148.651 63.639 
B-W ratio of education 0.905 0.913 0.934 
Police (per 1,000 population) 3.560 3.294 3.472 
Data Source: Author’s collection. 
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Table 5 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate between Blue and Red States (No Fixed 
Effects) 
    log(1+hate crime rate)   
 Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
              
Post -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
Blue States 0.059* 0.028** -0.007 0.016 0.019 -0.010 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.009) (0.036) (0.016) (0.010) 
Post X Blue 
States -0.031 -0.014* -0.004 -0.030 -0.013 -0.004 
  (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009) (0.007) 
GDP per capita    0.003 0.001 -0.000 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Black ratio    -0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Male ratio    -0.010 -0.009 0.002 
    (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) 
Population 
density    0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education    -0.040 0.029 -0.016 
    (0.116) (0.046) (0.027) 
Police    0.003 -0.000 -0.006* 
    (0.020) (0.010) (0.003) 
       
R-squared 0.030 0.031 0.012 0.240 0.047 0.031 
State Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year-Month 
Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers 2005 to 2012. 
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Table 6 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate (Democratic and Swing vs Republican, No 
Fixed Effects)  
   log(1+hate crime rate)  
 Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
              
Post -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
Democratic 
always States 0.097*** 0.041*** -0.005 0.065 0.041* -0.006 
 (0.035) (0.015) (0.011) (0.048) (0.022) (0.014) 
Swing States -0.023 -0.002 -0.013 -0.028 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.033) (0.012) (0.009) (0.033) (0.012) (0.009) 
Post X 
Democratic  
always States -0.036 -0.018* -0.005 -0.041* -0.018* -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) 
Post X Swing 
States -0.019 -0.006 -0.002 -0.015 -0.006 -0.002 
  (0.023) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per capita     0.001 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio     -0.004** -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Male ratio     0.011 0.001 0.004 
     (0.017) (0.008) (0.004) 
Population 
density     0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education     -0.033 0.032 -0.015 
     (0.111) (0.042) (0.027) 
Police     0.009 0.003 -0.006* 
     (0.021) (0.010) (0.003) 
        
R-squared 0.106 0.068 0.015 0.270 0.074 0.032 
State Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year-Month 
Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers 2005 to 2012. 
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Table 7 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate between Blue and Red States   
 log(1+hate crime rate) 
 Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
              
Post X Blue States -0.033* -0.016* -0.004 -0.037* -0.017** -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per capita    0.002 0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio    0.018 0.005 0.008 
    (0.020) (0.009) (0.007) 
Male ratio    0.016 0.010 0.003 
    (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) 
Population density    0.000** 0.000* 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education    -0.007 0.031 0.001 
    (0.053) (0.022) (0.033) 
Police    0.003 0.003 -0.001 
    (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
R-squared 0.576 0.353 0.218 0.584 0.360 0.222 
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 
Table 8 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate (Democratic and Swing vs Republican) 
 log(1+hate crime rate) 
 Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
              
Post X Democratic 
always States -0.038* -0.019* -0.005 -0.047** -0.023** -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) 
Post X Swing States -0.023 -0.009 -0.002 -0.014 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.010) (0.009) 
GDP per capita    0.003 0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio    0.018 0.005 0.008 
    (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) 
Male ratio    0.019 0.012* 0.004 
    (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) 
Population density    0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education    -0.004 0.032 0.002 
    (0.054) (0.023) (0.033) 
Police    0.003 0.003 -0.001 
    (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
       
R-squared 0.576 0.353 0.218 0.586 0.363 0.223 
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Periods cover 2005 to 2012. 
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Table 9 DDD Estimation of Hate Crime Rate for Heterogeneous Analysis  
 log (1+ hate crime rate)  
  
Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
(A) B-W Edu ratio              
Post X Democratic 
X Edu -0.577** -0.249** -0.130* -0.449** -0.192* -0.112 
 (0.218) (0.117) (0.068) (0.170) (0.098) (0.068) 
Post X Swing X Edu -0.196 0.021 -0.109 -0.139 0.045 -0.084 
  (0.265) (0.104) (0.081) (0.247) (0.109) (0.081) 
(B) Black ratio        
Post X Democratic 
X Black ratio -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Post X Swing X 
Black ratio -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
(C) Police        
Post X Democratic 
X Police 0.031 0.008 0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.010) (0.006) 
Post X Swing X 
Police 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.035 0.017 0.010 
  (0.034) (0.013) (0.010) (0.033) (0.014) (0.010) 
(D) GDP per capita        
Post X Democratic 
X GDP 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post X Swing X 
GDP -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Periods cover 2005 to 2012. 
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Table 10 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate in Period between 1997 and 2004 
 log(1+hate crime rate) 
 
Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
Total 
Anti-
Black 
Anti-
White 
              
Post X Democratic 
always States -0.015 -0.009 -0.004 -0.014 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) 
Post X Swing 
States 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.025 0.011 0.009 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) 
GDP per capita    0.008*** -0.000 0.000 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio    -0.033** -0.010* -0.010* 
    (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Male ratio    0.017* 0.011** 0.009*** 
    (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) 
Population density    -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education    0.084 0.033 0.005 
    (0.053) (0.025) (0.018) 
Police    0.002 -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) 
       
R-squared 0.598 0.412 0.257 0.619 0.412 0.279 
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,026 4,026 4,026 3,523 3,523 3,523 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. The sample periods used in the regression without controls cover 1997 to 2004. 
The sample periods used in the regression with controls cover 1998 to 2004 since there 
is no data for police employees in 1997. In addition, there is no data for education in 
Idaho in 1998, Massachusetts in 2001, North Dakota in 1998 and Vermont in 2000. 
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Table 11 DID Estimation of Violent and Property Crime Rate 
 log(crime rate) 
 Violent Property Violent Property 
          
Post X Democratic 
always States 0.015 0.031 0.026 0.027 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.035) (0.026) 
Post X Swing States -0.059 -0.042 -0.022 -0.031 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.036) (0.026) 
GDP per capita   0.014*** 0.003 
   (0.005) (0.003) 
Black ratio   0.037 -0.011 
   (0.029) (0.023) 
Male ratio   -0.006 0.016 
   (0.018) (0.017) 
Population density   0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education   -0.042 0.046 
   (0.162) (0.083) 
Police   0.007 -0.004 
   (0.022) (0.011) 
     
R-squared 0.973 0.952 0.976 0.954 
State Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Since this exercise considers yearly data, I define the post variable as the year after 
2009.  
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Table 12 DID Estimation of Different Type of Violent Crime Rate 
 log(crime rate) 
 Murder Rape Robbery 
Aggravated 
Assault 
          
Post X Democratic 
always States 0.045 0.003 0.046 0.025 
 (0.042) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) 
Post X Swing States -0.025 -0.045 -0.054 -0.001 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.045) 
GDP per capita 0.013 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.014** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Black ratio 0.019 0.035 0.031 0.057 
 (0.049) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) 
Male ratio -0.009 0.042* 0.000 -0.015 
 (0.042) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023) 
Population density -0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education -0.214 0.040 0.013 -0.069 
 (0.198) (0.150) (0.116) (0.193) 
Police -0.019 0.019 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) 
     
R-squared 0.944 0.942 0.990 0.968 
State Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Since this exercise considers yearly data, I define the post variable as the year after 
2009. 
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Table 13 DID Estimation of Different Type of Property Crime Rate 
 log(crime rate) 
  Burglary  Larceny Theft  
Motor Vehicle 
Theft 
        
Post X Democratic 
always States 0.045 0.035 -0.032 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.046) 
Post X Swing States -0.028 -0.018 -0.087* 
  (0.037) (0.021) (0.051) 
GDP per capita -0.003 0.002 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) 
Black ratio -0.011 -0.011 -0.045 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) 
Male ratio 0.023 0.020 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.045) 
Population density -0.000 0.000* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education -0.006 0.039 0.041 
 (0.097) (0.077) (0.138) 
Police -0.015 0.002 -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.021) 
    
R-squared 0.967 0.948 0.972 
State Effect YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 400 400 400 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Since this exercise considers yearly data, I define the post variable as the year after 
2009. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1 Black Peoples’ Perceptions about White Peoples’ Work Attitudes from 2000 to 
2012 
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Figure A2 Average Number of Republican Politician Affiliated with TMP by Political 
Group 55 
 
 
Figure A3 Average Number of Republican Politicians Affiliated with TMP by Political 
Sub-Group 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 The list of politicians affiliated with the TPM can be found on Wikipedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_politicians_affiliated_with_the_Tea_Party_movement.   
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Table A1 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate (Blue vs Red, With Trend) 
  log(1+hate crime rate)   
 Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
              
Post X Blue 
States -0.037* -0.037* -0.017** -0.014 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Male ratio 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Population 
density 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education -0.007 -0.007 0.031 0.031 0.001 0.001 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) 
Police 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.584 0.584 0.360 0.360 0.222 0.222 
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month 
Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Table A2 DID Estimation By Using Hate Crime Rate  
    hate crime rate   
  Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
      
Post X Blue States -0.048* -0.020** -0.002 
  (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDP per capita 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Black ratio 0.025 0.004 0.007 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.009) 
Male ratio 0.023 0.013 0.005 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) 
Population density 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education -0.004 0.030 0.007 
 (0.074) (0.027) (0.041) 
Police 0.003 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
R-squared 0.549 0.345 0.184 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES 
State Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Table A3 DID Estimation By Using Continuous Voting Ratio (Hate Crime Rate Case) 
   hate crime rate  
 Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
       
Post X Dem2008 -0.254* -0.117** -0.015 
 (0.128) (0.049) (0.038) 
GDP per capita 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Black ratio 0.021 0.002 0.007 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.009) 
Male ratio 0.028 0.015* 0.005 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) 
Population density 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education -0.010 0.027 0.007 
 (0.073) (0.026) (0.042) 
Police 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
R-squared 0.549 0.345 0.184 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES 
State Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Table A4 DID Estimation By Using Continuous Voting Ratio (Log Hate Crime Rate 
Case) 
   log(1+hate crime rate)  
 Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
     
Post X Dem2008 -0.190* -0.101** -0.019 
 (0.098) (0.042) (0.034) 
GDP per capita 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio 0.015 0.004 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.007) 
Male ratio 0.019 0.012* 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) 
Population density 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education -0.012 0.029 0.000 
 (0.053) (0.022) (0.033) 
Police 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
    
R-squared 0.584 0.361 0.222 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES 
State Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Table A5 DID Estimation of Hate Crime Rate (Dem and Swing vs Rep, With Trend) 
  log(1+hate crime rate) 
 Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
              
Post X Democratic 
always States -0.047** -0.042* -0.023** -0.017 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Post X Swing 
States -0.014 -0.027 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 0.002 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Black ratio 0.018 0.018 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Male ratio 0.019 0.020 0.012* 0.013* 0.004 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Population density 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of 
education -0.004 -0.004 0.032 0.032 0.002 0.002 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.034) 
Police 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
R-squared 0.586 0.586 0.363 0.363 0.223 0.223 
State Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Group Trend NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Table A6 DID Estimation By Using Hate Crime Rate (Dem and Swing vs Rep) 
   hate crime rate  
 Total Anti-Black Anti-White 
        
Post X Democratic always States -0.063** -0.027** -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.010) 
Post X Swing States -0.013 -0.003 0.004 
  (0.032) (0.011) (0.010) 
GDP per capita 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Black ratio 0.026 0.004 0.008 
 (0.027) (0.011) (0.009) 
Male ratio 0.028 0.015* 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.007) 
Population density 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
B-W ratio of education 0.001 0.032 0.008 
 (0.075) (0.027) (0.041) 
Police 0.003 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
R-squared 0.551 0.347 0.185 
Year-Month Effect YES YES YES 
State Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,241 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses. *** indicates 1% 
significance level, ** indicates 5 % significance level and * indicates 10 % significance 
level. Sample period covers from 2005 to 2012. 
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Chapter 3 The Long-Run Labor Market Consequences of Being Born in A Bad 
Economy56 
1. Introduction 
 
    A number of studies have documented that either an economic or environmental shock at 
an early stage of life might have a long-term negative impact on individual outcomes.57 
However, one gap among these studies is that they have not addressed how economic shocks, 
particularly in the year of birth, can affect future outcomes such as earnings in adulthood.58 
An economic shock in year of birth could affect later-life earnings via two possible channels: 
namely “financial input channel” and “time input channel”. Regarding the financial input 
channel, bad economic conditions are usually associated higher unemployment rates, fewer 
jobs and a loss of wealth (e.g. Pfeffer et al. (2013)). As a result, parents might not be able to 
provide their newly born children with enough nutrition and care during economic 
downturns due to their challenging financial situation. In addition, a range of studies indicate 
that mothers usually experience poorer general health status during recessions (e.g. Currie 
et al. (2015)). Olaffson (2016) shows that pregnant women subject to financial stress are 
likely to have babies with a lower birth weight, which is an important predictor of health in 
adulthood. Accordingly, children who are born during recessions could therefore be at risk 
of malnutrition and related disease. This risk would further impede children’s early 
childhood development and their human capital accumulation.59    
    On the other hand, the effect of the time input channel is clear since the opportunity cost 
of time is lower during recessions. This could lead to parents having more time to care for 
their babies (Aguiar et al. (2013)). Since spending more time with newborns could help them 
                                                          
56 In this study, a bad economy can be referred to a recession. 
57 Rao (2016) documents that there exists a negative correlation between the economic conditions 
experienced in childhood and education and income in later life. Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) 
find that graduating from college in the midst of bad economic conditions can have a long-term negative 
effect on earnings. In addition, studies (e.g. Almond (2006); Nelson (2010); Lin and Liu (2014)) show that 
the cohorts in utero during the peak of influenza pandemics exhibit lower educational attainment, lower 
income, reduced socioeconomic status and are also more likely to have a serious health problem. 
58 My study is similar to Rao (2016), who mainly investigates the impact of economic condition in childhood 
on later-life education and income. However, in contrast to Rao (2016), this paper focuses on the effect of 
economic conditions in year of birth on the later-life earnings.  
59 In this paper, the definition of human capital is kept generic. Schultz (1961) indicated that there are 
different kinds of human capital such as education, on-the-job training and health.  
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to develop their general abilities (e.g. Waldfogel (2006); Fox et al. (2013)), the time input 
channel could have a positive impact on children’s future labour market performance.  
    These two channels could result in differences in future economic outcomes between 
those born during economic downturns and those born in booms. If we observe that the 
earnings of those who were born in recessions are lower than the earnings of those who were 
born in booms, we could conclude that the negative effect of the financial input channel 
dominates any positive effect of time input channel. In effect, the initial economic 
disadvantages experienced by those born in a bad economy would result in a persistent wage 
scar. Accordingly, this paper attempts to examine whether people who were born in bad 
economic conditions suffer income losses in the future. In other words: does an economic 
shock in year of birth affect later-life earnings? 
Furthermore, when the financial channel matters in this way, its negative effect might vary 
across families. Simply put, the negative effects are likely to be more severe for low income 
families. As a result, in this paper, I would also like to examine whether the effects of 
economic conditions in the year of birth are heterogeneous across wage quartile groups.    
    To explore these questions, I utilise the 2000 US Census to study economic outcomes for 
males born between 1965 and 1979. The Census data allows me to identify an individual’s 
year and the state of birth, which helps us to measure the regional economic conditions that 
prevailed immediately after the birth. To measure these conditions, I use state unemployment 
rate, following the example of previous literature (e.g. Rhum (2000); Kahn (2010); Wu and 
Cheng (2010); Oreopoulos et al. (2012); Currie et al. (2015)). Since the state unemployment 
rate varies across the year and state of birth, I collapse the individual data at the level of year 
and state of birth. I then analyse log wage as a function of economic conditions at the state-
year level, including other control variables, such as the economic conditions in the year of 
graduation, educational attainment, occupation, industry, race, and marital status.  
    In my analysis, I use two empirical strategies: these are “Static” and “Dynamic effect” 
models. The “Static” model considers the relationship between wage and economic 
conditions at year of birth. The “Dynamic effect” model takes the economic conditions after 
year of birth into account to explore if economic conditions after the year of birth also affect 
individuals’ future wage.60 Empirical results from the “Static” model show a persistent and 
                                                          
60 As the basic estimate of the effect of the unemployment rate in year of birth exposure might capture the 
average change in earnings from being born in a recession given the regular evolution of the state 
unemployment rate faced afterwards, following Oreopoulos et al. (2012), this paper uses “Dynamic effect” 
model to address this concern.  
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negative wage effect of higher level of state unemployment rate in the year of birth. The 
estimate indicates a wage loss of 1% per one unit increase in the unemployment rate. The 
magnitude of wage loss is similar for those with and without college education. These 
findings suggest that males who were born in bad economic conditions may have lacked 
financial support from their parents and thus had difficulties in accumulating their initial 
human capital. The results of the “Dynamic effect” model confirm that the economic 
conditions at birth, rather than other factors, have a significant and negative impact on future 
wages. Regarding the analysis among different wage quartile groups, I observe the impact 
of economic shock at birth on the low wage groups is greater than the impact on high-wage 
groups. All the findings described above suggest that a negative economic shock in the early 
life of individuals, particularly the year of birth, is harmful to those individuals’ earnings in 
adulthood. 
    There are some challenges that could be applied to the interpretation. For example, fertility 
decisions might bias our estimation results. People at different family income levels may be 
more or less likely to have children during a recession. Taylor and Livingston (2011) indicate 
that fertility rates for the hispanic and black population decline substantially relative to 
whites in a recession year. Furthermore, policies such as the “Title X Family Planning 
Program” in 1970 could help low-income families with birth control.61 Accordingly, one 
may infer that a family at relatively higher income level could be more likely to have a child 
during economic downturns.  Thus, there may exist a positive selection effect that would 
bias our results. Since the empirical results show that initial economic conditions are 
negatively associated with later-life earnings, we may say that the estimates in this study are 
a lower bound estimate of the impact of recessionary conditions in the year of birth on later 
individual earnings.  
    This paper complements the literature which studies the relationship between economic 
or environmental conditions in early life and later economic outcomes (e.g. Almond (2006); 
van den Berg et al. (2006); Maccini and Yang (2009); Kahn (2010); Nelson (2010); 
Oreopoulos et al. (2012); Lin and Liu (2014); Rao (2016)). This paper differs from previous 
studies in that it mainly focuses on the examination of the long-run impact of an economic 
shocks at year of birth. This paper confirms that poor economic conditions in childhood, 
particularly at the year of birth, have a significant negative effect on later-life earnings.    
                                                          
61 Since the sample used in this paper was born between 1965 and 1979, this policy might play a role in 
affecting the fertility rate between 1965 and 1979.  
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    The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 
discusses possible mechanisms. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 
5 presents our findings and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper relates to the literature which discusses the long-run effect of early life shocks 
such as an economic or environmental shock on people’s later-life health or labour market 
outcomes etc. Regarding the studies about the effect of economic shocks on the later-life 
outcomes, Kahn (2010) uses the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) while 
Oreopoulos et al. (2012) use Canadian university–employer–employee matched data to 
examine whether people who graduate in recessions would have a lower earnings in the 
future due to job mismatch concerns. Both papers indicate that there does exist a persistent 
and negative wage effect of bad economic conditions in the year when people graduate from 
college. In addition, Rao (2016) examines the influence of the business cycle in childhood 
on economic outcomes in adulthood. His findings suggest that the average unemployment 
rate in childhood has a negative effect on the later-life education and income.  
    As well as studies on the impact of a recession on labour market outcomes, other studies 
examine the impact of economic conditions on longevity. For example, van den Berg et al. 
(2006) examine the impact of early-life economic conditions on longevity in the 
Netherlands. They find that those born during recessions had higher mortality rates later in 
life than those born during economic booms.       
    A number of papers have investigated the impact of environmental shocks on later life 
outcomes. For example, Barker (1992) developed the ‘Fetal Origins’ hypothesis, which 
argues that shocks experienced by the fetus during pregnancy impacts later life outcomes. 
Almond (2006) builds upon this hypothesis and uses US census data to study the effect of 
the 1918 US influenza pandemic on later educational attainment and income. His findings 
indicate that people in utero in this period have lower educational attainment and lower 
income than others. Similarly, Nelson (2010) and Lin and Liu (2014) examine this idea using 
Brazilian and Taiwanese data, respectively. Their findings also indicate that cohorts in utero 
during the 1918 influenza are shorter in height as children, less educated, and more likely to 
have a serious health problem later in life. Maccini and Yang (2009) investigate the effect 
of weather shocks around the time of birth on the adult health. By using rainfall data in 
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Indonesia as a proxy for weather shocks, they find that higher early-life rainfall leads to 
improved health, schooling levels, and general socioeconomic status for women but not for 
men. They attribute this to the gender bias in the allocation of nutrition. These studies 
confirm that an environmental shock at the early stage of individuals’ life does indeed play 
a role in influencing their outcomes in the future.     
 
3. Possible Mechanisms  
 
This section discusses how economic conditions at birth influence an individual’s outcomes 
in adulthood. I will mainly focus on the discussion of two mechanisms which might make 
people have different later-life economic outcomes: the financial input and time input 
channels.   
 
3.1 Financial Input Channel 
 
In a recession, households often experience a huge decline in wealth. For instance, Pfeffer 
et al. (2013) indicate that one-fourth of American families suffered at least a 75 % wealth 
loss and more than half of all families lost at least 25 % wealth between 2007 and 2011. Due 
to increased financial restrictions during a recession, parents may have insufficient financial 
security to support their children, including newborns. Furthermore, recessions might also 
affect the health of mothers. Currie et al. (2015) indicates that recessions are associated with 
decreased self-reported health by mothers and increased smoking and drug use. If a mother 
with poor health gives birth, the health of a newborn could be negatively impacted as well. 
Olafsson (2016) confirms this by showing that pregnant women under the stress associated 
with financial crisis are more likely to have lower birth weight babies.62 Hence, the lack of 
proper nutrition and lower birth weight would make the newborns be at high risk of ill health. 
Ill health in childhood is associated with worse human capital outcomes (e.g. Almond 
                                                          
62 Besides the financial stress mechanism, there also exist other possible channels that can lead the women to 
have low birth weight babies. Studies such as Torche (2011) and Duncan et al. (2017) also show that 
exposure to an earthquake or the Super Bowl is associated with an increased the likelihood of low birth 
weight due to these events would cause the psychological stress of a pregnant women. In addition, Almond 
and Mazumder (2011) indicates that Arab pregnant women who are exposed to Ramadan are more likely to 
have babies with lower birth weight as they may have less nutrition during the Ramadan.   
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(2006); Currie et al. (2010); Almond and Currie (2011b); Lin and Liu (2014)). Thus, the 
financial input channel causes lower lifetime earnings in newborns.  
 
3.2 Time Input Channel 
 
In contrast to the influence of the financial input channel, a bad economy might be helpful 
to newborns’ human capital accumulation. Since the price of leisure during recessions is 
relatively cheaper than during booms, parents could spend more time at home during 
economic downturns. Aguiar et al. (2013) confirm this by showing that households allocated 
roughly 5% of the foregone market work hours to child care in a recession period between 
2008 and 2010. Moreover, studies (e.g. Waldfogel (2006); Fox et al. (2013)) point out that 
if parents could spend more time with their children, children will have better social and 
cognitive development. Thus, the time input channel could have a positive effect on the 
newborns’ later-life labour market outcomes.  
    Since these two possible mechanisms at the year of birth would affect the early 
development of children simultaneously, the economic outcomes in adulthood would depend 
on which channel dominates. Accordingly, if the empirical result shows that people who 
were born in recessions have lower earnings than those who were born during economic 
booms, we may conclude that the financial input channel dominates the time input channel.   
 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Measure for Bad Economic Conditions 
 
The main variable of interest is economic conditions at the year of birth. As mentioned in 
the previous section, initial economic conditions could have either a negative effect or 
positive effect earnings via two channels. Thus, for this study it is important to find a good 
variable to measure the economic conditions that prevail at the time of birth. By following 
previous studies (e.g. Rhum (2000); Khan (2010); Wu and Cheng (2010); Oreopoulos et al. 
(2012); Currie et al. (2015); Rao (2016)), I use the unemployment rate as a proxy for 
macroeconomic conditions at the year of birth.  
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    In addition to the measure for economic condition in the year of birth, I also use one 
variable which measures the economic condition when an individual graduated from school. 
This variable reveals the effect of economic situation at year of graduation on later-life 
income. Here, I briefly discuss how I construct this variable for each individual. Since the 
census data do not provide precise information regarding when an individual graduated from 
the schools, I use individuals’ educational level to infer the year of graduation. For example, 
if an individual educational level is grade 12, I infer that their year of graduation is “year of 
birth +5 + 12”, where “5” is years before schools and “12” is the total years of schoolings. 
By constructing the information of year of graduation, I can use the unemployment rate at 
year of graduation in place of birth to measure the economic condition when an individual 
graduated. 
 
4.2 Data 
 
The data set used for this study is 2000 US Census data and I mainly focus on the male 
cohorts between 1965 and 1979.63 The sample born after 1979 is discarded because people 
born after 1979 had insufficient labour experience in the survey year. In addition, I discard 
the sample born before 1965 as I do not have enough information on economic conditions 
when they were born. Since the main independent variable, the unemployment rate, varies 
across year and region (state) of birth, I collapse the individual data at the level of year and 
region (state) of birth.64 The collapsed variables are the real wage, the ratio of educational 
attainments above university-level, the proportion of white people, the proportion of married 
people, the proportion of those with management occupation and of those working in 
manufacturing industry.65  
    Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of samples. The result from column (1) indicates 
that real wage of the full sample is about 16,244 dollars in 2000.66 The proportion with 
university degrees is about 0.215. Whites form the majority of the population in the full 
sample. Moreover, the proportion of those who got married is about 0.468. The proportion 
                                                          
63 Ideally, we can use more cohort samples from the 2010 US Census data to examine the idea. However, the 
2010 Census data is not released by the US government so we are not able to use the samples from 2010 
Census data set to study the idea.   
64 Oreopoulos et al. (2012) collapse their data for the same reason.  
65 The university variable refers to the people who study in the 4 years or 5+ years of college. 
66 This wage is deflated by the CPI index based on a 1982 base of 100. If this wage is deflated by the CPI 
index based on a 1999 base of 100, it will be about 27,423 dollars.   
 102 
 
of people having management jobs and the proportion of people working in the manufacture 
industry are about 0.203 and 0.178, respectively.   
    The results in column (2) and column (3) indicate that people with educational attainments 
above the college level earn substantial more than those without such attainments. The 
proportion of those with a university degree in the sample with educational attainments 
above college is about 0.433. Moreover, the sample with educational attainments above 
college also has a higher share of people who had management jobs than the sample with 
educational attainments below college. The share of people working in manufacture industry 
is lower in those in the higher education group. Both the groups are, however, balanced in 
terms of the ratio of white people and married people. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
4.3 Static Model 
 
To examine the impact of economic condition at year of birth on the later-life income, I use 
the empirical model below:  
log(𝑤𝑏𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛾𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑈𝑅𝑏𝑦 + 𝑋𝑏𝑦𝛿 + 𝜀𝑏𝑦                  (1)                                           
, where  𝑏 refers to the place of birth and 𝑦 refers to the year of birth. log(𝑤𝑏𝑦) is the log 
real wage per year of birth in each region of birth in the year 2000. 𝑈𝑅𝑏𝑦 is the 
unemployment rate at the time of birth in each birth region. The vector 𝑋𝑏𝑦 represents the 
characteristics measured at each cohort in each region in the year 2000. These characteristics 
variables include not only the variables discussed in the data section but also a measure of 
the unemployment rate dated at the time that an individual graduated. Taking this 
unemployment rate into account can help us to compare the magnitude of its impact on the 
college graduate earnings with the findings in the previous literature.67 The coefficients 𝛾𝑏 
and 𝛾𝑟 are place and year of birth fixed effects, respectively. The year dummy variable can 
capture the differentials between different years of birth and the region dummy variable can 
                                                          
67 As mentioned before, this variable is constructed by using the information of individual educational level. 
Therefore, there might exist measure errors, which could bias the estimate of impact of economic condition at 
year of graduation on the individuals’ earnings, in this variable.  
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capture the differentials between different regions of birth. Furthermore, the region dummy 
variable can also help us to control for the time-invariant unobserved characteristics. The 
coefficient of main interest, 𝛽0, which measures the impact of the economic situation at birth 
on the earnings, will help us to understand which mechanism plays the most significant role 
in affecting the later-life income.  
 
4.4 Dynamic Effect Model 
 
The model discussed above is a “Static” model since it does not consider the effects of 
economic conditions in other years. It is well recognised that child mental development 
proceeds rapidly during the first five years of life. Low incomes or a lack of health insurance 
in the first five years may also play a role in a child’s later-life outcomes (e.g. Almond and 
Currie (2011b)). Hence, in order to know the effect of early life economic conditions, I add 
the state unemployment rate in the first five years after the year of birth into my empirical 
model.68 This lets me extend the “Static” model into a “Dynamic effect” model which is 
written as follows: 
log(𝑤𝑏𝑦) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛾𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
5
𝑖=0 𝑈𝑅𝑏(𝑦+𝑖) + 𝑋𝑏𝑦𝛿 + 𝜀𝑏𝑦                 (2)                               
The coefficients of main interest are 𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, … ,5 since they can help us to understand the 
Dynamic effects of early life macroeconomic conditions on later-life earnings. These 
coefficients can also help us identify which year in the child’s early development period is 
the most important in influencing later-life earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68Since the “Static” model does not consider the effects of economic conditions of other years, the omitted 
variable problem will bias the estimation from the “Static” model. Thus, the “Dynamic effect” model also 
solves part of the omitted variables problem. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) also use the term “Dynamic effect” 
model that describes the economic conditions of the years after college graduation.   
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5. Main Results 
5.1 Results from Static Wage Model 
 
Before considering the main empirical results, Figure 1 shows that there exists a negative 
relationship between state unemployment rates at the time of birth and real wages in each 
state. Table 2 then shows that the impact of the state unemployment rate in the year of birth 
on the real wage is persistent and negative when we consider the full sample estimates. One 
can see the magnitude of the coefficient of main interest decreases about 7% when 
considering the place and year of birth fixed effects in the model. This could be because the 
model without fixed effects is capturing the role of general regional and time effects. For 
example, the tendency of region to display persistent weak economic conditions over time 
or the incidence of negative macroeconomic shock that occurred in a particular year. In terms 
of the magnitude, the estimates from the models with fixed effects and other controls indicate 
that the wage loss associated with bad economic conditions is about 1% for every one unit 
increase in state unemployment rate. In addition, one can also observe that bad economic 
conditions in the year of graduation have a negative effect on future earnings. In this case, a 
one unit increase in the unemployment rate at the year of graduation is associated with a 0.9 
% earnings loss.  
    Table 3 shows the results from other samples, namely the sample with educational 
attainments above college and the sample with educational attainments below college.69 The 
findings indicate that the impact of economic condition at time of birth on earnings is 
negative and again confirm that the financial input channel matters. Regarding the 
magnitude, from column (4), one can see that one unit increase of unemployment rate at 
birth is associated with 1.1% earning loss for the high-educated sample and 0.8% earnings 
loss for the less educated sample. In addition, one also can see that a one unit increase of the 
unemployment rate at the year of graduation is associated with 1% earning loss for the high-
educated sample and 0.6% earnings loss for the other sample. If we compare the estimate of 
                                                          
69 I also examine the extent to which educational attainment may be a mediating channel for the wage effect I 
observed. To do this, I set educational attainment as the dependent variable and related to the same measures 
of economic conditions in the year of birth that I use for my main specification. The result as shown in Table 
A1 indicate that the economic condition in the year of birth did not affect educational outcomes. This implies 
that educational attainment is not playing a significant role in driving the wage effect seen in my main 
specification. Thus, the impact of economic conditions in the year of birth on the later-life earnings could be 
via other mechanisms such as the childhood development of cognitive skills or non-cognitive skills (e.g. 
Carneiro et al. (2007)).       
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the impact of economic condition at year of graduation to the earnings of the college group 
with the estimates in the previous studies (e.g. Kahn (2010); Oreopoulos et al. (2012)), one 
can find that the estimate in this paper is lower than the estimates in the previous studies.70  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
5.2 Results from Dynamic Effect Model 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the Dynamic effect regression model. The magnitude of 
the negative impact of the economic situation at year of birth on the earning is similar across 
different samples. A one unit increase in the unemployment rate is associated with 1.1-1.2% 
lower earnings. I find that economic conditions during the first five years after birth did not 
have significant effects on earnings. I also find that the magnitude of the effects of economic 
conditions at graduation varies across different samples. For example, a one unit increase in 
unemployment rates at the year of graduation is associated with 1% earning loss for the 
sample with educational attainments above college, which is again lower than the estimates 
in previous studies.71    
 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                          
70 The estimates of Table 4 in Khan (2010) and Table 1 in Oreopoulos et al. (2012) is between 1.6 % and 9 
%. The lower estimates in this study could be driven by the measurement error since I do not have precise 
information to identify when the college graduates graduate. 
71 In addition, I also test for difference between the white and non-white samples. The results are shown in 
Table A2 and Table A3. From Table A2, one can see that the wage effect of economic conditions in the year 
of birth is significant in both of the white and non-white samples. The magnitude of coefficient is quite 
similar across the two groups. Table A3 tests the same hypothesis using an interaction term and confirms that 
there is no difference in the effects of economic condition of year of birth across the white and non-white 
samples.   
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5.3 Wage Group Analysis  
 
The findings from the previous section have shown that economic conditions at birth had a 
persistent and negative impact on later-life incomes. As we mentioned in the introduction, 
the effect of financial input channel might vary across families and thus make the newborns 
have different level of initial human capital and different later-life earnings. To see if the 
effect could vary across wage groups, I use apply quantile regression to examine this issue.72 
From Table 5, one can see the negative impact of economic shock at year of birth is relatively 
larger in the low wage groups than in the high-wage groups. For example, from column (1), 
one can see that that a one unit increase in the size of the economic shock is associated with 
a 1.5% earnings loss in the lowest wage group (i.e. 0.1 wage quantile) but the impact is 
insignificant in the highest wage group (0.9 wage quantile). The negative impact seems to 
decay as the wage goes up. This implies that the initial economic shock matters, especially 
in the low-wage groups. I also plot these estimates in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4. These 
figures give us a clearly declining impact of economic condition at year of birth across wage 
groups. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
                                                          
72 I use “residual” wage and “residual” unemployment variables in the quantile analysis. The “residual 
variables” are the variables without the effects of year of birth, place of birth and other controls such as 
occupation and education. To get the residual variables, we can regress the variables of interests on other 
variables. We can then obtain the residuals which are thus defined as residual variables.   
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5.4 Some Concerns 
 
There might exist a positive selection bias from fertility decisions during the economic 
downturns in my estimation. Parents in different income levels may be more or less likely 
to have children in a recession year. In fact, in the report of Taylor and Livingston (2011), 
which analyses US fertility data from 2008 to 2009, showed that both the Hispanic and Black 
fertility rates tended to declined substantially more than whites during an economic 
downturn.   
    In addition, on the policy side, the US government implemented the “Title X Family 
Planning Program”. This was enacted in 1970 to help the low-income families with birth 
control. This program may have caused poorer families to have fewer children. Thus, given 
these two observations, we may infer that families at higher income levels are more likely 
to have children during periods of bad economic conditions. This could have positive 
impacts on newborn life choices in recessions and thus would impart a positive bias to our 
estimates. If this is the case, we can think of our estimate as a lower bound of the impact of 
the effect of being born in a recession on the individuals’ earnings.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I estimate the impact of economic conditions at the year of birth on the later-
life earnings of individuals. An initial economic disadvantage may have either a positive or 
negative impact on the earnings of individuals through two different channels: the financial 
input channel and the time input channel. Two models are applied, a “Static” model and a 
“Dynamic effect” model. The main result from the “Static” model was that economic 
conditions at year of birth had a long-term negative impact on earnings. The earnings loss is 
around 1% per one unit increase in unemployment rate. The magnitude of the effect is similar 
among males with different levels of educational attainment.  
    The result from “Dynamic effect” model confirms that economic conditions at the year of 
birth play a significant role in influencing an individual’s later-life earnings. In addition, the 
quantile analysis results further suggest that the initial economic shock affects more those in 
low wage groups than those in high wage groups. All the findings suggest that the financial 
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input channel plays a greater role than the time input channel in affecting an individual’s 
labour market performance. The fact that the economic conditions at year of birth have a 
long-term significantly negative impact on individuals’ later-life earning is an important and 
relevant finding for policymakers.  
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Table 1 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
  Full Sample Sample Above College Sample Below College 
Wage 16244.0 
(4678.3) 
18373.4 
(6576.8) 
14055.7 
(2875.8) 
University 0.215 
(0.088) 
0.433 
(0.153) 
- 
White 0.832 
(0.131) 
0.866 
(0.115) 
0.801 
(0.146) 
Married 0.468 
(0.179) 
0.468 
(0.211) 
0.463 
(0.155) 
Management 0.203 
(0.061) 
0.349 
(0.095) 
0.0616 
(0.021) 
Manufacture 0.178 
(0.059) 
0.138 
(0.048) 
0.214 
(0.074) 
Observations 750 750 750 
Note: The number in parentheses is a standard error. Samples are male cohorts between 
1965 and 1979. The University variable refers to the people who study in the 4 years or 
5+ years of college. Data Source: 2000 US Census. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between Wage and Unemployment
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
 
 
Table 2 Static Model Estimation 
Dependent variable  log(wage)   
Birth Year UR -0.088*** 
(0.009) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
Graduation Year UR 
- - - 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
Place of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 750 750 750 750 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 1 
% significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Table 3 Static Model Results of Different Educational Groups 
Panel A Sample Above College  
Dependent variable  log(wage)   
Birth Year UR -0.112*** 
(0.011) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Graduation Year UR - - - -0.010** 
(0.005) 
Place of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 750 750 750 750 
Panel B Sample Below College   
Dependent variable  log(wage)   
Birth Year UR -0.063*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
Graduation Year UR - - - -0.006** 
(0.002) 
Place of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth No Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Observations 750 750 750 750 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 1 
% significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Table 4 Dynamic Effect Model Estimation 
  
Full Sample Sample Above 
College 
Sample Below 
College 
Dependent variable  log(wage)  
Birth Year UR -0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Birth Year UR(+1) 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Birth Year UR(+2) -0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0003) 
Birth Year UR(+3) 0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Birth Year UR(+4) -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Birth Year UR(+5) 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Graduation  Year UR -0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Place of Birth Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 750 750 750 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 1 
% significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Table 5 Quantile Regression Estimation 
 
Full Sample Sample Above 
College 
Sample Below 
College 
Dependent variable log(wage) 
 
0.1 
 
-0.0153*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0042) 
 
0.2 
 
-0.0157*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0176*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0157*** 
(0.0033) 
 
0.3 
 
-0.0182*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.4 
 
-0.0170*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0189*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.5 
 
-0.0145*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.6 
 
-0.0113*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0158*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0122*** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.7 
 
-0.0085*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0133** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0084*** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.8 
 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0037 
(0.0031) 
 
0.9 
 
-0.0015 
(0.0033) 
-0.0084* 
(0.0049) 
-0.0043 
(0.0030) 
Observation 750 750 750 
Note: *** indicates 1 % significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 
10 % significance level. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Figure 2 Quantile Estimation of Full Sample 
 
 
Note: Quantile regression plot by using collapsed residual unemployment rate and 
collapsed full sample residual real wage data from males born between 1965 and 1979. A 
confidence interval is associated each estimate in each quantile. 
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Figure 3 Quantile Estimation of Sample with Educational Attainments above College 
 
 
Note: Quantile regression plot by using collapsed residual unemployment rate and 
collapsed sample residual real wage data from males born between 1965 and 1979. A 
confidence interval is associated each estimate in each quantile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 117 
 
 
Figure 4 Quantile Estimation of Sample with Educational Attainments below College 
 
 
Note: Quantile regression plot by using collapsed residual unemployment rate and 
collapsed sample residual real wage data from males born between 1965 and 1979. A 
confidence interval is associated each estimate in each quantile. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Education Estimation 
 High Education (Above College) 
    
Birth Year UR 0.002 
 (0.002) 
Birth Year UR(+1) 
0.001 
 (0.001) 
Birth Year UR(+2) 
0.002* 
 (0.001) 
Birth Year UR(+3) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
Birth Year UR(+4) 
0.001 
 (0.001) 
Birth Year UR(+5) 
0.000 
 (0.001) 
  
Place of Birth YES 
Year of Birth YES 
Controls YES 
Observation 750 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 
1 % significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. The control variable in the estimation is racial variable, proportion of 
white population. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Table A2 Results of Different Racial Groups 
  White Non-White  
  Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Dependent variable log(wage) 
          
Birth Year UR -0.010** -0.013*** -0.011** -0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Birth Year UR(+1)  0.004  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
     
Birth Year UR(+2)  0.001  -0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
     
Birth Year UR(+3)  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
     
Birth Year UR(+4)  0.000  -0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
     
Birth Year UR(+5)  0.004  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
     
Graduation  Year 
UR -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.008** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Place of Birth YES YES YES YES 
Year of Birth YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Observation 750 750 749 749 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 
1 % significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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Table A3 Difference Estimation Between White and Non-White Samples 
 Static 
Dependent variable log(wage) 
  
White X Birth Year UR -0.004 
 (0.004) 
  
White X Graduation  Year UR -0.003 
 (0.005) 
  
Place of Birth YES 
Year of Birth YES 
Controls YES 
Observation 1499 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at the place of birth in parentheses. *** indicates 
1 % significance level. ** indicates 5 % significance level. * indicates 10 % significance 
level. This table shows only estimates of interest and the estimates are from weighted 
regression models. Data Source: 2000 US Census.  
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